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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, BANKRUPTCY WAIVERS, 
AND CONSOLIDATION IN BANKRUPTCY 
Daniel J. Bussel* 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate law formalities that impede effective bankruptcy relief are 
properly overridden in bankruptcy. Those formalities generally count for little 
outside bankruptcy and should not hamstring a bankruptcy court’s ability to 
afford effective relief consistent with the underlying policies of the Code. 
Nevertheless, recent scholarship and caselaw in bankruptcy, reflecting a 
contract uber alles zeitgeist, has given too much credence to both entity 
partitions that are blind to the reality of how firms actually operate and 
contractual barriers to voluntary bankruptcy relief baked into corporate 
charters. Bankruptcy law should refocus on honoring substance over form. In 
doing so, corporate formalities will properly yield to underlying substantive 
bankruptcy policy. The limited role of corporate formalities in the event of 
insolvency should be factored into market expectations surrounding asset 
securitization, including the frailty of both entity partitions within corporate 
groups, and bargained-for restrictions on entities’ access to bankruptcy relief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Strangely, bankruptcy law—once the vanguard of enterprise liability1—
increasingly kowtows to the formalities of corporate law that stand in the way 
of effective reorganization. Despite longstanding express exemptions under state 
corporate law, itself,2 and even as bankruptcy lawyers and judges reach for 
workarounds and settlements that permit enterprise-wide reorganizations and 
liquidations, bankruptcy courts and scholars assume that bankruptcy law 
regularly defers to corporate law formalism at significant cost to the underlying 
policies animating the Bankruptcy Code.3 
In two particular areas, corporate law is seen as imposing rigid and 
substantive limitations on bankruptcy rights. These perceived limitations 
sometimes preclude bankruptcy courts from crafting enterprise-wide insolvency 
relief consistent with the terms and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code: 
First, although bankruptcy courts have long held that access to bankruptcy 
relief may not be waived in a contract,4 those same courts have generally 
deferred to corporate law’s decision to defer to contractual governance 
arrangements baked into corporate charters that hinder or preclude an entity 
from filing for bankruptcy relief.5 
 
 1 The Landers-Posner debate over enterprise liability in insolvency cases was a watershed in the 
development of enterprise theories of liability. See generally Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to 
Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975) [hereinafter Landers, 
A Unified Approach]; Jonathan M. Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1976) [hereinafter Landers, Another Word]; Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors 
of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976). 
 2 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (2011) [hereinafter DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW].  
 3 See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2013); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 
1 (1996); see generally Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 381 (1998). But see William H. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 237, 259–62 (2007) [hereinafter Widen, Corporate Form]; William H. Widen, Report to the American 
Bankruptcy Institute: Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation in Large Public Company Bankruptcies from 
2000 to 2005, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Widen, Report]. Unless otherwise noted, 
section references herein are to the United States Bankruptcy Code, tit. 11 U.S.C.  
 4 See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 815 (2012) (“Thorpe could not contract away its right to avail itself of the protections 
of § 524(g).”); In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code extinguishes the 
private right of freedom to contract around its essential provisions.”); In re Weitzen, 3 F.Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 
1933) (“It would be repugnant to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to permit the circumvention of its object by 
the simple device of a clause in the agreement, out of which the provable debt springs . . . .”) (quoting Fed. Nat’l 
Bank v. Koppel, 148 N.E. 379, 380 (Mass. 1925)).  
 5 See, e.g., In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am., 891 F.3d 198, 207–09 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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Second, bankruptcy courts generally respect the legal boundaries between 
affiliated entities within a corporate group for substantive insolvency law 
purposes, even as those boundaries are routinely ignored for operational, 
financial, tax, and regulatory purposes.6 
The explosion in “securitization” over the last twenty-five years is a primary 
driver of both phenomena.7 “Securitization” is based upon segregation and 
transfer of certain assets of an “originator” into a “bankruptcy-remote” trust or 
corporate subsidiary that is intended to remove the securitized assets from a 
future bankruptcy estate of the originator. The technique was developed to 
permit financial institutions to tap into the public debt markets to fund home 
loans and later commercial real estate mortgages. Until the early 1990s, the 
market for securitized debt outside of mortgage-backed securities was of de 
minimis proportions.8 But beginning in the 1990s, the technique was 
increasingly employed as a form of corporate finance with non-financial 
originators purporting to segregate assets in securitization vehicles as an 
alternative to traditional secured working capital lending.9 The bankruptcy 
implications of this use of securitization—which may involve segregating 
assets, sometimes crucial operating assets, in corporate subsidiaries that are 
disabled by their charters from commencing bankruptcy proceedings without the 
consent of their secured lender—are quite distinct from securitizations 
sponsored by financial institutions to fund their lending operations. Financial 
institutions are regulated entities, raise highly specialized issues regarding 
 
 6 See In re Owens-Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 2005). On the other hand, courts routinely grant 
procedural consolidation or “joint administration” for purposes of docketing, filing, serving of notices, and 
general case administration, at the “first-day” hearing. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015. See, e.g., Gill v. Sierra Pac. 
Constr., Inc. (In re Parkway Calabasas Ltd.), 89 B.R. 832, 836 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d, 949 F.2d 1058 
(9th Cir. 1991). More substantively, in multi-debtor cases it is also common for all the affiliated debtors to 
employ the same bankruptcy counsel and for the United States Trustee to appoint a single official creditors 
committee. One way to manage resulting conflicts of interest when they become acute is to appoint separate 
committees or subcommittees or “conflicts counsel” to handle those matters that raise conflicts of interest 
between affiliated debtors. See, e.g., In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 327 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).  
 7 See infra notes 164–72, and accompanying text.  
 8 Joseph Shenker & Anthony Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New 
Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1380–81 & n.49 (1991). The Sperry-Univac transaction in 1985 is usually said 
to be the first private-label corporate asset-based securitization, private-label to denote that the issuer was a 
private bank rather than a government sponsored enterprise (GSE) and corporate asset to denote that the 
securitized assets were corporate assets rather than real estate mortgages. Structured Financing Techniques, 50 
BUS. LAW. 527, 538 (1995); see also Miguel Segovia et. al., Securitization: Lessons Learned and the Road 
Ahead 8 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 13-255, 2013), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/ 
Issues/2016/12/31/Securitization-Lessons-Learned-and-the-Road-Ahead-41153. 
 9 Securitization markets collapsed following the financial crisis of 2008, but more recently, securitization 
activity in most sectors has rebounded to meet or exceed pre-financial crisis levels. The details are discussed in 
the Appendix infra at notes 221–31, and accompanying text. 
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systemic risk and public policy, and are ineligible for bankruptcy relief.10 
Applying securitization techniques to a non-financial originator, however, 
particularly when core working capital assets are used as collateral, directly 
implicates the problem of bankruptcy opt-out by the originator’s secured 
lenders. This upsets the nuanced statutory balance drawn in the Bankruptcy 
Code between the rights of secured lenders and other constituents in bankruptcy 
cases, and potentially undermines the rehabilitative and reorganization policies 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Securitizing core assets of non-financial companies 
raises the concern of bankruptcy opt-out and is the subject of this Article.  
More than twenty years ago, my UCLA colleague Lynn LoPucki suggested 
“the death of liability,” by which he meant a systemic inability of the holders of 
tort claims and statutory claims to collect judgments.11 For large corporations, 
the coming death of liability would result from continued growth in the then 
nascent practice of hiving off assets and pledging them exclusively to particular 
investors or contractual counterparties.12 LoPucki hypothesized at length that 
through a combination of complex parent-subsidiary structures, security 
interests, and modern asset securitization techniques, large wealthy corporate 
groups would render themselves judgment-proof.13 At a time when Exxon was 
the most valuable enterprise in the world, LoPucki imagined a “Zero-Asset 
Exxon.”14 By aggressively employing these strategies, Exxon could render itself 
judgment-proof without adversely affecting or reducing the massive scale of its 
operations.15 When LoPucki forecast the death of liability, a judgment-proof 
“Zero-Asset Exxon” seemed far-fetched given the vast wealth of the actual 
Exxon Corporation and the massive liability it was dealing with arising out of 
the catastrophic Exxon Valdez shipwreck and oil spill in Prince William Sound.16 
It seems less fanciful now.17  
 
 10 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), (3) & (d) (2019). 
 11 LoPucki, supra note 3, at 20–25. 
 12 Id. at 15–28. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 25–28. 
 15 Id. In LoPucki’s hypothetical, Zero-Asset Exxon’s working capital would be supplied through 
revolving secured credit rather than retained earnings and all other assets would be hived off to support secured 
debt the proceeds of which would be distributed to shareholders—not unlike a typical aggressively structured 
leveraged buy-out transaction.  
 16 See James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki’s the Death of 
Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1364 (1998). Responding two years after LoPucki’s article, Professor White 
expressed deep skepticism about LoPucki’s prediction of companies becoming increasingly judgment-proof 
through securitization. 
 17 See Dov Solomon, The Rise of a Giant: Securitization and the Global Financial Crisis, 49 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 859, 868–71 (2012) (discussing the explosion of securitization in the 2000s as a method of judgment 
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Indeed, in 2013, prominent bankruptcy scholars Douglas Baird and Anthony 
Casey addressed the same phenomenon of “entity partitioning” that LoPucki had 
described seventeen years before in the context of what they described as 
“withdrawal rights” from insolvency proceedings.18 Their fundamental premise 
was that bankruptcy law operated on entities, not enterprises.19 They suggested 
that sophisticated parties had finally fully absorbed this lesson and created an 
opt-out regime whereby they could and did effectively exclude the operation of 
bankruptcy law on their interests by hiving off critical assets into separate legal 
entities.20 Bankruptcy restructuring had become optional, not mandatory, for 
these parties. 
Baird and Casey chose the Los Angeles Dodgers as their headline example,21 
noting that the enterprise relied on three interdependent highly specialized 
assets: the Dodgers baseball team, Dodger Stadium which stands isolated from 
downtown Los Angeles in Elysian Park, and its adjacent parking lots.22 Dodger 
Stadium, the third oldest ballpark in the country, is perfectly suited for major 
league baseball and just about nothing else. In true Angelino fashion, most fans 
drive to Dodger games in their own cars. The sprawling parking lots adjacent to 
Dodger Stadium provide parking for them during the baseball season. 
Notwithstanding the obvious economic integration of the parking lots, 
stadium, and team, all of which were held under common ownership and 
continuously operated together as part of a unified enterprise for fifty years pre-
bankruptcy, by the time of the Dodgers’ bankruptcy, each asset was held in a 
separate limited liability company.23 The LLCs owning the team and the stadium 
filed for bankruptcy relief, but the parking lot LLC did not.24 Moreover, there 
were serious questions regarding the nonconsensual retention of the team’s 
franchise agreement with Major League Baseball.25 Baird and Casey note: “the 
 
proofing assets); see also Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, Strategic Judgment Proofing, 39 RAND J. ECON. 
926, 27–28 (2008) (observing the substantial increase in the use of securitization and other judgment proofing 
strategies in recent years). 
 18 Baird, supra note 3, at 5.  
 19 Id. at 4–5.  
 20 Id. at 5. But see infra note 97, and accompanying text.  
 21 Baird, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 22 Id. at 3–4. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id. 
 25 The uncertainty regarding the ability of the team to assume its major league franchise agreement is a 
result of a widely recognized drafting error in section 365 that Congress has struggled to correct. From a 
bankruptcy policy perspective there is no sound reason to prohibit a reorganizing chapter 11 debtor from 
assuming its own executory contract. Daniel J. Bussel & Edward A. Friedler, The Limits on Assuming and 
Assigning Executory Contracts, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 321, 337–38 (2000).  
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Dodgers’ bankruptcy was emphatically not a world in which all stakeholders had 
to work together and no one had the right to leave the scene.”26 
Playing Pollyanna to LoPucki’s Cassandra, Baird and Casey conclude by 
suggesting: 
By allowing a limited number of investors to opt out of bankruptcy in 
a particular, discrete, and visible way, investors as a group may be able 
to both limit the risk of bargaining failure and at the same time enjoy 
the disciplining effect that a withdrawal right brings with it. Whether 
this preliminary assessment is correct, however, is not nearly as 
important as understanding the role that withdrawal rights play under 
existing law and their part in the much larger challenge of integrating 
a theory of the firm with the law of corporate reorganizations.27 
This Article suggests that some courts28 and leading bankruptcy scholars 
such as LoPucki, Baird, and Casey, reflecting a broader zeitgeist29 celebrating 
contract uber alles, give too much credence to entity partitions that are blind to 
the reality of how firms actually operate. Bankruptcy law should refocus on 
honoring substance over form. Experience teaches that there is a place for 
mandatory ex-post-bankruptcy renegotiations displacing prepetition contractual 
arrangements based on current realities and traditional bankruptcy policies.30 
 
 26 Baird, supra note 3, at 4. 
 27 Id. at 48. For a theory of integrating the firm with the law of corporate reorganization, see Lynn M. 
LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741, 749–55 (2004). 
 28 The Dodgers bankruptcy court, however, was not one of them. The Dodgers’ consensual plan of 
reorganization largely respected entity partitions but left the Major League Baseball franchise agreement 
purportedly subject to withdrawal rights in place. It is unclear what the outcome would have been had substantial 
parties in interest litigated the extent of the withdrawal rights asserted by the equity owners of the parking lot 
LLC and Major League Baseball rather than compromise. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Confirming Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for Los 
Angeles Dodgers LLC and Its Debtor Affiliates, In re Dodgers LLC, No. 11-12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. June 
27, 2011), ECF No. 1700. 
 29 Of course, freedom of contract has deep roots in commercial law. For centuries, much common law 
has consisted of “default rules” that can be varied by contract, custom, or trade usage to the contrary, and modern 
commercial law has adopted this approach quite explicitly. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law 
of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1535–36 (2016). The balance between freedom 
of contract and other social policies, however, has fluctuated over time. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, ch. V 
at 100 (1861) (“the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract”) (emphasis in original). Mandatory rules and regulations limiting the scope of freedom of contract 
were more in favor mid-20th century than they seem to be now. A notable indicator of the shift in the insolvency 
realm has been the increasingly broad scope Congress and the courts have given statutory “safe harbors” created 
for derivatives and other sophisticated financial transactions. Transactions falling within the safe harbors are 
effectively exempt from being restructured, stayed, or avoided in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546, 555, 556, 559–
62 (2019). Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883 (2018), may represent some long 
overdue retrenchment on this front. 
 30 See Iman Anabtawi & Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Ex-Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability 
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Bankruptcy solves the central collective action problem posed by corporate 
insolvency31 by creating a collective proceeding.32 Alternatively (and 
inconsistently) allowing individual creditors “withdrawal rights” would also 
solve the collective action problem—but only by sacrificing aggregate wealth 
maximization, the interests of non-withdrawing non-consenting creditors and 
other third parties, and the social interest in debtor rehabilitation and 
reorganization—all to the private interest of the withdrawing creditor. 
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code properly limits any given parties’ freedom 
to contract around its essential provisions.33 Withdrawal rights are inconsistent 
with bankruptcy policy. 
Baird and Casey correctly note that a central overall intellectual project 
should be to integrate a theory of the firm with the law of corporate 
reorganization.34 That is a large project and it makes sense to approach it in steps. 
I have not developed a fully integrated theory of the firm, much less fully 
integrated that nonexistent theory with corporate reorganization law. But no 
such theory animates state corporation codes in any comprehensive or rigorous 
way either. Scholars have formulated various partial and contingent models, 
based on transaction and agency cost theories,35 team production theory,36 
artificial legal personhood,37 aggregation of natural persons,38 nexus of 
contracts,39 the firm as stand-in for stakeholder constituencies constrained by 
 
of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 113–16 (2013); Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating 
Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 663 at 689–90, 707 (2009) (discussing role of creditors’ committees 
in case dispositive sales, settlements, and financings). 
 31 For the avoidance of doubt, this Article is expressly limited to problems associated with corporate 
governance and corporate insolvency. Although securitization of revenue streams is common in municipal 
finance, the discussion here is not intended to deal with the special problems associated with municipal finance, 
including proper treatment of segregated special revenues pledged to support debt issuances, and the complex 
interplay between the financial restructuring of distressed municipalities, and local governmental powers and 
administration.  
 32 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7–19 (1986); MANCUR 
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1–4 (1965).  
 33 See In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (“The Bankruptcy Code extinguishes the 
private right of freedom to contract around its essential provisions.”). 
 34 Baird, supra note 3, at 48. 
 35 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Thomas S. Ulen, 
The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 312–13 (1993). 
 36 See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 37 See generally Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Henry Hansmann, Reinier 
H. Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2006). 
 38 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708 (2014).  
 39 Compare G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
887 (2000) (critiquing nexus theory but adopting a contract-based view of the nature of the firm), with Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985), and 
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public policy,40 or the outcome of a creditors’ bargain.41 Other models are 
certainly possible.42 Any plausible theory of the firm robust enough to function 
in and out of bankruptcy, however, must focus on the substantive role of the 
corporation in commercial and social life, not corporate law formalities. To the 
extent that corporate law formalities become impediments to effective 
bankruptcy reorganizations in particular, but also to efficient liquidations, those 
formalities are quite properly overridden by bankruptcy law.43 Bankruptcy law 
is not fully integrated on a theoretical level with the corporations codes; it 
preempts them, thereby limiting the efficacy of the entity partition techniques 
observed by LoPucki, Baird, and Casey (among others).44 Those limits should 
be factored into market expectations surrounding asset securitization and other 
structuring techniques designed to avoid the ordinary operation of bankruptcy 
law upon a particular creditor’s claim. If they are properly factored in, it is 
difficult to believe that securitization of core assets of operating companies will 
remain a cost-effective alternative to more traditional financing arrangements. 
The market should place little value on a bankruptcy withdrawal right that is 
likely to prove illusory when it matters most. 
Part I of this Article surveys the general lay of the land regarding corporate 
governance and enterprise liability in and out of bankruptcy. Part II addresses 
the problem of the waiver of bankruptcy rights through contract-based corporate 
governance mechanisms. Part III discusses the problem of entity partition and 
the substantive consolidation doctrine. Part IV builds on the waiver and 
substantive consolidation discussions to critique securitization as a technique for 
skirting the basic bankruptcy policy decision to permit the restructuring of 
secured debt in bankruptcy. A short conclusion follows. 
 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Concept that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the 
Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999).  
 40 See generally David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the 
Corporation, 107 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 139 (2013). 
 41 See generally JACKSON, supra note 32. 
 42 For excellent survey and critique of the extant models, metaphors and heuristics regarding corporations, 
see STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Oxford 2008); see 
also Lynn Stout, Corporate Entities: Their Ownership, Control, and Purpose in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (2018).  
 43 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 303 (2011) (bankruptcy exception). Compare Prod. Res. Group, 
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 792, 794 n. 67 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that a corporation’s insolvency 
“makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by any fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm’s 
value”), with N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) 
(holding that creditors of an insolvent corporation may not assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
against corporate directors.)  
 44 Baird, supra note 3, at 6–7; LoPucki, supra note 3, at 15–32. 
BUSSELPROOFS_4.30.20 5/3/2020 3:56 PM 
108 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AND OUT OF BANKRUPTCY 
Almost all firms employing more than a single individual are conducted 
through some form of limited liability entity;45 even many firms that are 
functionally sole proprietorships are so organized.46 Larger enterprises, whether 
privately or publicly held, are almost always organized as affiliated limited 
liability entities in a “corporate group.”47 Corporate law48 treats each limited 
liability entity as a separate legal person with its own assets and liabilities, and 
subject to certain exceptions (guarantees and contractual assumption of liability, 
corporate veil-piercing, and alter-ego actions, independent co-debtor liability), 
thereby insulates each entity’s equity interest holders and affiliates from liability 
for the entity’s debts. The decision to institute voluntary bankruptcy proceedings 
is generally a decision for the board of directors, but corporate charters 
sometimes seek to fetter the discretion of the board to authorize the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition.49 
Given the vast amount of wealth held in corporate form, and the vast amount 
of economic activity engaged in by such entities,50 corporate law would seem to 
 
 45 See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of 
New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed 
for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 461–63 (2009). 
 46 See John A. Pearce II & Ilya A. Lipin, The Uncertain Viability of a Single Member Limited Liability 
Company as a Choice of Entity, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 423, 424 (2013) (“Many entrepreneurs looking to 
formalize their businesses often turn to SMLLC [Single Member Limited Liability Company] structure as their 
entity of choice. In the last decade, the popularity of SMLLCs has ‘skyrocketed’ and their use has steadily 
risen.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 47 See generally John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study of 
Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2008). 
 48 For convenience, I use “corporation” generically to refer to any form of limited liability business 
association, including corporations, joint-stock companies, unincorporated companies or associations, limited 
liability companies, limited liability partnerships, and business trusts. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (2019) (defining 
“corporation” broadly for bankruptcy law purposes). Similarly, I use “corporate law” and “corporate 
governance” generically to refer to the law governing any form of limited liability business association. Although 
limited liability companies and partnerships, like “close corporations,” DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 351 (2011), may 
be managed directly by their equity interest holders rather than by an elected board, management tends to be 
centralized along the lines of the corporate model as such firms become larger. Nevertheless, the titles, 
appointment, duties and powers of the centralized managers in these entities may vary significantly from the 
typical corporate model. 
 49 Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945) applies the general rule vesting the power to authorize bankruptcy 
filings in the board but appears to rely solely on otherwise applicable state corporate law as the source of this 
rule. See infra text accompanying note 113.  
 50 I have not found reliable current statistics on aggregate assets held in corporate form in the United 
States. It is fair to assume, however, that virtually all business assets, and, leaving to the side owner-occupied 
residences, the vast proportion of real estate investments, are held in corporate form. In 2017, the Fortune 500 
alone had aggregate revenues of $12.8 trillion—equal to two-thirds of the Nation’s GDP. Alan Murray & David 
Meyer, New Fortune 500, Trade War Pause, Facebook Breakup Call: CEO Daily for May 21, 2018, FORTUNE, 
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be a matter of great import. In fact, I suggest below, that notwithstanding all the 
ink expended on corporate law and corporate governance, corporate law should 
hardly matter at all, either in or out of bankruptcy. Corporate constituents’ rights 
and liabilities inter se and vis-à-vis the corporation are determined by market 
forces, contract, federal securities law, and other positive law, including federal 
bankruptcy law, not state corporation codes.51 
Although they may be varied by contract in most instances, nonbankruptcy 
corporate governance rules vest control of the corporation in a board of directors 
elected by shareholder plurality vote.52 The board’s governance prerogative is 
subject to limited exceptions requiring shareholder majority vote53 over certain 
major actions,54 at least so long as the corporation remains solvent,55 
functional,56 outside bankruptcy,57 and not in dissolution.58 Outside of these 
exceptions, the scope of board discretion is very great indeed, at least when 
outright self-dealing is not at issue.59 
 
https://fortune.com/2018/05/21/fortune-500-china-trade-facebook-breakup-call-ceo-daily-for-may-21-2018/.  
 51 For a thoughtful discussion of the diminishing role of corporate law outside of bankruptcy, see Zohar 
Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263, 277–89 (2019). 
 52 DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 216(3) (2011). 
 53 Id. at § 216(2). 
 54 Majority shareholder consent is required to amend the certificate of incorporation, DEL. GEN. CORP. 
LAW § 242, merge, DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 251–58, dissolve, DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 275, or sell 
substantially all assets of the corporation (including assets held in wholly owned subsidiaries). DEL. GEN. CORP. 
LAW §§ 242–75 (2011). For an excellent theoretical overview of the current state of play in corporate law over 
the respective roles of shareholders and the board in corporate governance, see STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
 55 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 291 (2011) (providing for appointment of state law receiver for 
insolvent corporation).  
 56 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 226 (2011) (providing for appointment of a custodian to manage a 
corporation in the event of deadlock or for other cause). 
 57 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 303 (2011) (bankruptcy exception). 
 58 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §§§ 278–79 (2011) (post-dissolution operation and management).  
 59 Traditionally the “business judgment rule” affords directors immunity from liability so long as they act 
in good faith and satisfy their duties of care and loyalty. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 
360–61 (Del. 1993). Although the business judgment rule in theory remains bounded by the duty of care, breach 
of the directors’ duty of care is measured by a gross negligence standard. Moreover, key jurisdictions now permit 
corporations to exculpate directors from the duty of care entirely. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 102(b)(7) (2011); cf. 
In re Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc. S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1177–78 (Del. 2015) (noting that a charter 
provision may exculpate directors from duty of care but not duty of loyalty or bad faith claims). One important 
exception to the business judgment standard is directors’ approval of self-interested transactions. Those are 
evaluated on a fundamental fairness standard. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 368 (“[A] trial court will not find a 
board to have breached its duty of care unless the directors individually and the board collectively have failed to 
inform themselves fully and in a deliberate manner before voting as a board upon a transaction as significant as 
a proposed merger or sale . . . . Only on such a judicial finding will a board lose the protection of the business 
judgment rule under the duty of care element and will a trial court be required to scrutinize the challenged 
transaction under an entire fairness standard of review.”).  
Even the duties of good faith and loyalty may be circumscribed in material ways under many modern 
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In bankruptcy, however, corporate governance radically changes.60 New 
institutions—the bankruptcy court, perhaps a bankruptcy trustee,61 or, if not a 
trustee, then sometimes a court-approved chief restructuring officer,62 one or 
more creditors’ committees,63 maybe an equity committee64 or an examiner 
too65—assume governance responsibilities. Neither corporate law nor any pre-
bankruptcy contractual arrangements define the roles of these new actors while 
the company is in bankruptcy.66 The bankruptcy court may grant individual 
creditors, especially secured creditors precluded from exercising their state law 
 
limited liability company statutes. Delaware, along with twenty-five other states, permits waiver of the members’ 
and managers’ duty of loyalty in an LLC operating agreement. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1101(c), (e) (2013); 
1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES app. 
9-6 at 684–85 (2d ed. 2018). The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, which is law in most of the rest of 
the United States, however, does not permit such a waiver. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b) (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1994). Nevertheless, members may consent to specific 
potential conflicts of interest disclosed in their agreement. To the extent they do so, the duty of loyalty may be 
meaningfully circumscribed even in jurisdictions that do not permit the elimination of the duty of loyalty. See, 
e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b) 5–6 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1994) 
(parties may designate activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty if the designation is not manifestly 
unreasonable); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 16103(b)(3)–(4), 16404 (2019). Even Delaware, however, makes its 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing non-waivable. DEL CODE ANN. Tit. 6 § 18-1101(c), (e) (2013). 
See generally H. Justin Pace, Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Delaware Will Lead, but Will 
Anyone Follow? 16 NEV. L.J. 1085 (2016).  
 60 The modern disconnect between nonbankruptcy and bankruptcy governance regimes has been 
persuasively attributed to the federalization of insolvency law and its administration by specialized federal courts 
while corporate law remained a matter of state law administered by state courts. David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking 
the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 487–91 (1994).  
 61 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1104(a)–(b) & 1106 (2019). Under these statutes, trustees are routinely 
appointed in chapter 7 cases but only appointed for cause in a chapter 11 case. If a trustee’s appointment is 
ordered and there is sufficient creditor interest to hold an election, unsecured creditors may choose a qualified 
“disinterested person” to serve as trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14), 321–22, 702, 1104(b) (2019). Once a trustee is 
appointed, the governance prerogatives previously held by the board of directors (or other governing board) are 
vested in the trustee. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); see also 
11 U.S.C. § 323 (2019).  
 62 Douglas G. Baird, Chapter 11’s Expanding Universe, 87 TEMPLE L. REV. 975, 983 n.34 (2015) (noting 
that in the forty then most recent large chapter 11 cases, thirty-five percent of debtors engaged professional 
turnaround firms and fifteen percent installed CROs). 
 63 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103 (2019). See generally Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition Building Through 
Bankruptcy Creditors’ Committees, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1547, 1549–51 (1996); Bussel & Klee, supra note 30, at 
688–91, 736.  
 64 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a), (b)(2) (2019). 
 65 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(c), 1106(b) (2019). See Daniel J. Bussel, A Third Way: Examiners as Inquisitors, 
90 AM. BANKR. L. J. 59, 81–84 (2016); Jonathan Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L. J. 1 (2010). 
 66 Chief restructuring officers also exist outside of bankruptcy. As a formal matter, their authority in such 
cases is delegated authority from the board of directors. To the extent that the board appoints a chief restructuring 
officer under pressure from creditors (the usual case), revocation of the delegated authority or other board 
interference with the chief restructuring officer may breach forbearance or other agreements with creditors. 
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remedies but furnishing continuing financing,67 new interim supervisory powers 
over the debtor.68 Moreover, when not displaced by a trustee or chief 
restructuring officer, corporate managers and directors become fiduciaries 
owing first duties to the creditors, rather than shareholders.69 Primary 
responsibility for representing shareholder interests shifts to large shareholders 
themselves either individually or in some cases through the appointment of large 
holders to an “equity security holders committee” appointed by the U.S. Trustee 
or on order of the bankruptcy court.70 Neither board nor shareholder consent 
may be necessary to exit chapter 11 or to determine the shape and governance 
of the reorganized firm under a creditor’s plan of reorganization;71 neither board 
nor shareholder consent is sufficient to exit chapter 11 or confirm the debtor’s 
own plan of reorganization.72 
Corporate law is a great redoubt of formalism, but insolvency law, rooted in 
equity, celebrates substance over form and gives primacy to bankruptcy policies 
focusing on the protection of creditor interests, maximization of aggregate value, 
 
 67 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) (automatic stay); 363(a), (c), & (e) (use of cash collateral); 364 (post-petition 
extensions of credit) (2019).  
 68 See Robin Phelan & Ocean Tama, The Use of DIP Financing As A Mechanism To Control the 
Corporate Restructuring Process, 44 TEX. J. BUS. L. 15 (2011); Harvey Miller & Shai Waisman, Creditor in 
Possession, 21 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (2003); Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution 77–78, nn. 41–
46 (Coase-Sandor Wkg Paper Series in Law & Econ. No. 755); AM. BANKR. INST, ABI Report of the Commission 
to Study Reform of Chapter 11, 26–28 (2014); Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 69 (2004).  
 69 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); Wolf v. Weinstein, 
372 U.S. 633, 649–50 (1963); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1108.09[2], 1108.10; see also North American 
Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007). These authorities, of course, 
make the debtor-in-possession’s management fiduciaries with duties to all parties-in-interest, but if the estate is 
clearly insolvent, creditor interests are paramount. Note that in proposing a plan, however, the debtor’s 
management acts in its capacity as fiduciaries for the debtor, not the debtor-in-possession. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 
(2019). The statute in this way subtly recognizes that in connection with the plan process the debtor may be in 
an adversary position with respect to some or all creditor interests. See DANIEL J. BUSSEL & DAVID A. SKEEL, 
JR., BANKRUPTCY 532 (10th ed. 2016). 
 70 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a), (b)(2) (2019). 
 71 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(c), 1129(b) (2019). Debtors’ exclusive right to file a plan ends no more than 
eighteen months after the bankruptcy filing and may lapse or terminate earlier by court order or the appointment 
of a trustee. Id. at § 1121(b), (c), (d)(2) (2019); see also Matter of Gaslight Club, Inc. 782 F.2d 767, 770–72 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (court appointing responsible person to represent the debtor-in-possession); Manville Corp. v. Equity 
Security Holders’ Committee (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 66 B.R. 517, 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (enjoining 
a shareholders’ meeting called to replace the board of directors as potentially disruptive of pending chapter 11 
proceedings).  
 72 Reorganization plans are usually confirmed with the informed consent of all impaired classes of claims 
and interests. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124–1126, 1129(a)(8) (2019). A plan, however, may be confirmed without the 
consent of a particular impaired class if the court finds that the “cramdown” standard of § 1129(b) is met as to 
that class. In a successful cramdown, the confirmed plan binds the nonconsenting class as well as everyone else. 
Both consensual and cramdown plans must comply with the legal standards of § 1129(a) which may be raised 
by the court itself, dissenting members of consenting classes, or other objecting constituents in the case.  
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fair distribution of the value so maximized consistent with legal priorities, and 
rehabilitation and reorganization.73 
Even outside of bankruptcy, corporate law formalism fits poorly for 
corporate groups consisting of affiliated corporate entities under common 
ownership. Corporate law regulates the internal affairs among shareholders and 
those who manage the company.74 Other corporate constituents—creditors, 
employees, customers, the public—are neither empowered by nor regulated by 
corporate law.75 For corporations that are subsidiaries of other corporations, 
however, assuming (as is the common case) that there are no minority 
shareholders to empower or protect, compliance with corporate law is merely 
form for form’s sake.76 
Accordingly, corporate managers, quite rationally and routinely, ignore the 
separate legal personhood of subsidiaries within the corporate group save as they 
grudgingly render tribute at the altar of legal compliance to gain some tax, 
licensing, accounting or regulatory benefit, or protect the broader corporate 
group from failures of performance or legal liabilities incurred by their own 
wholly-owned and controlled affiliates.77 From an operating perspective, 
businesses function along geographic and product lines to maximize value of the 
whole enterprise rather than any particular subsidiary.78 Key corporate functions 
 
 73 Bankruptcy’s substance over form ethos has a long pedigree in the United States Supreme Court 
caselaw. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. 610 (1873); see also 
Consumer News and Bus. Channel Partnership v. Financial News Network Inc. (In re Financial News Network 
Inc.), 980 F.2d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that “in bankruptcy proceedings substance should not give way 
to form”). See generally Daniel J. Bussel, Doing Equity in Bankruptcy, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13 (2018). 
 74 See David Min, Corporate Political Activity and Non-Shareholder Agency Costs, 33 YALE J. REG. 423, 
438 (2016). 
 75 Id. at 444–46. 
 76 See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 1.03, at 1-6–1-9 (2d ed. Supp. 
2005) (noting that in 2002, the 100 largest American corporations owned, on average, 187 subsidiaries, with the 
high being a company owning 1,876; ninety-five percent of those subsidiaries were at least ninety-five percent 
owned by the parent corporation). 
 77 See Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to the Parent: Holding Company Liability for Subsidiary Banks—
A Discussion of the Net Worth Maintenance Agreement, the Source of Strength Doctrine, and the Prompt 
Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2353, 2355 (1995); see also Corrigan v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
478 F.3d 718, 724 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that corporate veil piercing was not allowed where general 
partnership was formed by wholly owned subsidiaries of the parent corporations, even though formed only a 
month a part and involved in the same transactions). 
 78 Corporate management’s focus on aggregate corporate profits and parent share price has long been 
known or assumed to be the case. See also Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 605, 615 (2011). See generally Landers, Another Word, supra note 1, at 527. The phenomenon has 
been most extensively documented in connection with multinationals that manipulate transfer pricing and 
financing decisions to minimize the consolidated group’s overall tax liabilities, particularly the liability for 
United States federal income taxes. See Glen Rectenwald, Note, A Proposed Framework for Resolving the 
Transfer Pricing Problem: Allocating the Tax Base of Multi-National Entities Based on Real Economic 
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such as strategic management, tax, legal and accounting functions, cash 
management, and capital allocation, are routinely centralized at the parent 
level.79 The board and management of the parent, consistent with customary 
compensation arrangements and their fiduciary duty to parent shareholders, 
rationally adopt an enterprise-wide perspective.80 Corporate formalities within 
domestic United States corporate groups at subsidiary levels should mean 
nothing to the extent that it is the law’s policy to reflect and support underlying 
business realities.81 A corporate enterprise operated through a series of affiliated 
companies under common management and ownership is one economic unit.82 
If the corporation is not dominated by a single controlling shareholder, 
minority shareholders’ formal corporate law rights usually do not matter at the 
parent level for publicly-held corporations either.83 Dissatisfied shareholders 
routinely sell their shares, or if they continue to hold them, remain passively 
dissatisfied, rather than organize themselves to assert their governance 
prerogatives under corporate law.84 The extralegal machinations of activist 
 
Indicators of Benefit and Burden, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 425, 425–26 (2012).  
 79 See Robert Charles Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 787, 
816–22 (1979). 
 80 Senior management is generally incentivized by grants of parent equity or options to purchase the 
parent’s equity, and the amount of such grants is typically tied to the achievement of financial metrics tied to the 
overall enterprise’s performance. See id. at 832–33. 
 81 The special problems posed by the foreign subsidiaries of multinational groups based in the United 
States are outside the scope of this Article. See infra notes 91, 127. 
 82 Courts have generally articulated fact-specific requirements in determining whether the corporate 
group is really one economic unit for corporate veil-piercing and bankruptcy purposes. See Fish v. East, 114 
F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940). But they generally avoided recognizing the overarching reality that corporate 
groups operate on an enterprise-wide basis. See Landers, supra note 1. 
 83 See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate 
Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 383–94, 464 (1994) (“It is difficult to contend 
seriously that shareholders have a meaningful role in corporate governance under existing regulations.”). Goforth 
discusses in depth the ways in which shareholder control over corporate governance has been diluted and eroded 
over time and the resulting low rates of participation. Indeed, in the context of mergers and acquisitions, minority 
shareholders may be afforded some protections such as appraisal rights, and when the transaction involves 
insiders, the right to contest the fairness of the entire transaction. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 262 (2011); In re 
Nine Systems Corp. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 3940-VCN, (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014). 
 84 Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy & Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 
1735 (2005) (“[T]he housekeeping rules of corporation law effectively preclude shareholders from initiating 
corporate decisions . . . . [T]he extent to which corporate law is stacked against shareholder ‘intervention power’ 
goes beyond just the housekeeping rules; much of business law acts to limit shareholder involvement in corporate 
governance”); Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676 (2007) 
(arguing that corporate shareholders lack any “‘powers of corporate democracy’”). But see Marcel Kahan & 
Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 987 (2010) (“[C]hief executive officers of publicly held 
corporations in the United States are losing power to their boards and to their shareholders . . . . [T]his decline 
in CEO power represents a long-term trend, rather than a temporary response to economic and political 
conditions.”) Kahan and Rock credit shareholder activism and regulatory changes to shareholder voting as the 
source of CEO-disempowerment. See also Goshen, supra note 51, at 283–84, 308–10 (describing 21st century 
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investors and the possibility of hostile acquisition—a market mechanism rather 
than a legal mechanism—is the most salient constraint on the management of 
most solvent public companies, and the most meaningful protection for public 
shareholder interests from weak or faithless boards and managements.85 
Of course, corporate law does matter for shareholders of privately-held 
corporations (other than de facto sole proprietorships) that do not reside within 
corporate groups.86 But where governance really matters, it is highly unusual for 
shareholders to rely on off-the-rack governance arrangements set out in state 
statutes.87 Shareholders will generally negotiate specialized governance rules 
and embody their rights and responsibilities in a shareholder agreement, 
operating agreement, or otherwise in the firm’s organizational documents.88 
Governance becomes a matter of contract among equity holders rather than 
positive law. 
Those governance contracts, however, do not limit the government’s 
regulatory powers in many areas. 89 The tension between the substantive 
objectives of many regulatory regimes and corporate law formalism has been 
directly resolved in favor of substantive regulatory compliance in these fields. 
The federal tax code, tort law, labor and employment law, and various other 
bodies of regulatory law are prominent examples of regulatory regimes that may 
impose enterprise-wide liability when members of the corporate group fall 
within the jurisdiction of tax authorities, courts, or regulators.90 
Thus, virtually all U.S.-based corporate groups file consolidated tax returns 
under the control of the parent of the corporate group.91 Firms are taxed on an 
 
rise of activist investors and its implications for nonbankruptcy corporate governance).  
 85 Goshen, supra note 51, at 283–84; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 
73 J. POL. ECON. 110. 113–15 (1965). The existence of a controlling shareholder may undermine the market for 
corporate control and focus more attention on minority shareholders’ rights under the applicable corporation 
law. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
785, 785–87 (2003) (“[T]he presence of a large shareholder may better police management than the standard 
panoply of market-oriented techniques . . . . The presence of a controlling shareholder reduces the managerial 
agency problem . . . .”). 
 86 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:2 (Rev. 3d ed. 
2015). See also Book Review: Close Corporations, Law and Practice (Callaghan 2d ed. 1971), 72 COLUM. L. 
REV. 604, 605 (1972) (“Given the statutory norm of transferable share interests and management by an elected 
board of directors, assurance of detailed control by shareholders [of a closely held corporation] requires either 
an agreement or special provisions in the articles of incorporation or bylaws.”). 
 87 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 86, at § 4:2.  
 88 Id. 
 89 See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 76, at pt. IV. 
 90 Id. 
 91 26 U.S.C. § 1501 (2019); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-75 (2018). See Martin J. McMahon, Understanding 
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enterprise-wide basis without regard to corporate law.92 Other regulatory 
obligations likewise extend to all members of a corporate group under a wide 
variety of labor, environmental, and regulatory regimes.93 Increasingly, common 
law tort liability has expanded to impose enterprise liability directly on affiliated 
corporate group members, or indirectly, by expanding the scope of duty to 
injured persons to encompass supervisory and other activities conducted or 
directed by the tort-feasing entities’ affiliates.94 
Similarly, finance, like government and commerce, typically deals with a 
corporate group as a unified enterprise rather than as separate legal entities. 
Financial reporting is done, and credit is extended on an enterprise-wide basis 
supported by suretyship and co-obligor relationships among corporate group 
affiliates that effectively contract around the limited liability rules created by 
corporate law.95 
II. WAIVING ACCESS TO BANKRUPTCY THROUGH A CORPORATE CHARTER 
Bankruptcy law is premised upon a collective execution principle that 
requires protection against individual creditors’ ability to opt out.96 Thus, federal 
bankruptcy policy precludes contractual waiver of the debtor’s right to file a 
bankruptcy petition or (within limits) to discharge and restructure claims 
through bankruptcy.97  
 
Consolidated Returns, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 125, 127 (2012) (“Virtually all publicly owned United States 
corporations, as well as the handful of large privately owned corporations that cannot (or chose not to) make an 
election under subchapter S, as well as the domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations, elect to report their 
income for federal tax purposes as part of a consolidated group rather than as separate entities.”). 
 92 Historically, an important caveat to this principle is taxation of foreign subsidiaries. TCJA, enacted in 
2017, whatever its other merits or demerits, has belatedly begun to address the problem of the accumulation of 
untaxed profits in foreign subsidiaries of United States based corporate groups. See J. Clifton Fleming, Robert 
J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Expanded Worldwide Versus Territorial Taxation after the TCJA, 161 TAX NOTES 
1173 (Dec. 3, 2018); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The International Provisions of the TCJA: Six Results after Six 
Months (U. of Mich. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 18-021, 2018; U. of Mich. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 
621, 2018).  
 93 See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947). 
 94 See Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1329–33 (2001) (“At the turn of the twenty-first century, enterprise liability conceptions 
compete with fault conceptions for control over various domains of the common law of torts.”). 
 95 See Widen, Corporate Form, supra note 3, at 244–47 (critiquing Owens-Corning). 
 96 See JACKSON, supra note 32, at 123–38 (1986). 
97See, e.g., Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied 568 U.S. 815 (2012) (“To confirm the § 524(g) plan, Thorpe also needed the affirmative 
vote of 75 percent of asbestos claimants voting on the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). If Thorpe 
did not negotiate with asbestos claimants and their representatives to set a plan that they would support, a 
successful reorganization would not have been possible. If, in negotiating the terms of the plan, Thorpe had to 
accommodate the asbestos claimants’ interests in preserving direct action rights and maximizing the trust’s 
insurance assets—interests potentially adverse to those of Continental—it is not liable to Continental for doing 
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The principle that prospective contractual waivers of basic debt protection 
rights, including access to federal bankruptcy relief, are unenforceable, is 
embodied in basic contract law, independent of express statutory provisions 
outlawing such contracts. The Restatement Second of Contracts provides that “a 
promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
against the enforcement of such terms.”98 The public policy supporting 
application of the doctrine may be based upon either legislation or “the need to 
protect some aspect of the public welfare.”99  
If a contract is found to be void as against public policy, courts may refuse 
to enforce the contract and leave both parties as they were before entering the 
agreement. But so long as the parties are acting in good faith, a court may sever 
the unenforceable provision and still enforce the rest of the agreement in favor 
of a party who did not engage in serious misconduct if the performance as to 
which the agreement is unenforceable is not an essential part of the agreed 
exchange.100 Corbin discusses in particular how prospective waivers of certain 
fundamental rights and privileges violate the public policy doctrine,101 and 
further notes that fundamental debtor protections such as the mortgagor’s equity 
of redemption,102 statutory exemptions from collection of judgment,103 usury104 
 
so. Thorpe could not contract away its right to avail itself of the protections of § 524(g).”) (citing Bank of 
China v. Huang (In re Huang), 275 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Wank v. Gordon (In re Wank), 
505 B.R. 878 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014); In re Jeff Benfield Nursery, Inc., 565 B.R. 603 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 2017) 
(denying enforcement of pre-bankruptcy automatic stay waiver); Nw. Bank & Trust Co. v. Edwards (In re 
Edwards), 439 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2010); Double v. Cole (In re Cole), 428 B.R. 747 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2009); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 842 (Bankr. N.D.Ala. 1999) (“Courts have long held that a pre-
dispute agreement to waive benefits conferred by the bankruptcy laws is wholly void as against public 
policy.”); In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (agreement not to file bankruptcy for certain 
time period is not binding); In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code 
extinguishes the private right of freedom to contract around its essential provisions.”); In re Weitzen, 3 
F.Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y.1933) (“It would be repugnant to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to permit the 
circumvention of its object by the simple device of a clause in the agreement, out of which the provable debt 
springs . . . .”) (quoting Fed. Nat’l Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157 (1925)).  
 98 REST. (2D) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1). 
 99 Id. at § 179. 
 100 Id. at § 184. 
 101 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 88.7 (Rev. Ed. 2019). See also WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12.1 et seq. 
(4th ed. 2019). 
 102 See, e.g., Harlee v. Federal Fin. Corp., 34 Del. 345, 353–54 (Del. Super. Ct. 1930); Desseau v. Holmes, 
187 Mass. 486, 487 (Mass. 1905); Mitchell v. Automobile Sales Co., 161 Tenn. 1, 6–7 (Tenn. 1930). 
 103 See, e.g., Indus. Loan & Inv. Co. v. Super. Ct., 189 Cal. 546, 547–48 (Cal. 1922); Weaver v. Lynch, 
79 Colo. 537, 538–39 (Colo. 1926); New York v. Avco Fin. Serv. of N.Y., Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 383, 387–88 (N.Y. 
1980).  
 104 See, e.g., Indus. Loan Co. v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Motor Contract Co. 
v. van der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 451 (Wash. 1931).  
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and bankruptcy rights have long been prominent examples of contracts void as 
against public policy.105 Finally, uniform law concerning bankruptcy is a matter 
of particular federal interest under the Constitution and states are precluded from 
creating special exceptions to the public doctrine targeted at limiting these 
federally created and protected rights.106  
Courts have long extended this principle to business entities as well as 
individual debtors.107 Contractual waivers of the right to file for bankruptcy or 
other core bankruptcy rights are therefore not enforceable.108 This policy of 
forbidding bankruptcy waivers extends to so-called “ipso facto clauses” that 
 
 105 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 88.7 (Rev. Ed. 2019).  
 106 HSBC Bank USA v. Branch (In re Bank of New Engl. Corp.), 364 F.3d 355, 364–66 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(Bankruptcy Code preempts state common law “rule of explicitness” operating to disallow creditor’s right to 
post-bankruptcy interest as a bankruptcy specific rule of contract law); see also AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 
533 U.S. 333, 338–40 (2011) (Federal Arbitration Act preempts California unconscionability doctrines targeted 
at arbitration). Indeed, courts have found that state insolvency statutes that are in competition with the federal 
bankruptcy scheme are subject to implied or field preemption in light of the Constitutional decision to confer on 
Congress the power to make uniform laws concerning bankruptcies. Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 
518, 524–25 (1933); Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613–15 (1918); Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 
394 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 208 (1819) (Contracts 
Clause limits state authority to enact bankruptcy legislation). These authorities are analyzed in KENNETH N. 
KLEE & WHITMAN L. HOLT, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 1801–2014, at 124–46 (West Academic 
2015). 
 107 In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 261 B.R. 103, 114–15 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); In re Pease, 195 B.R. 
431, 432–34 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996); In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698, 698–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (“It would be 
repugnant to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to permit the circumvention of its object by the simple device 
of a clause in the agreement, out of which the provable debt springs . . . . It would be vain to enact a bankruptcy 
law with all its elaborate machinery for settlement of the estates of bankrupt debtors, which could so easily be 
rendered of no effect.”) (quoting Fed. Nat’l Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157 (1925)). The existence of this long 
line of precedent in this area is an important factor for modern courts. “Although the power of the courts to 
invalidate bargains of parties on grounds of public policy is unquestioned and is clearly necessary, the 
impropriety of a transaction should be convincingly established in order to justify the exercise of the power. 
How far courts should extend public policy beyond what has already been established by precedent, in the 
absence of a clear-cut declaration of such policy by constitution, legislation or judicial precedent has been 
questioned . . . .” 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12.3 (4th ed. 2019) (internal citations omitted).  
 108 Bankruptcy’s recognition of security interests and other competing property rights in the debtor’s assets 
is a crucial qualification on this principle. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, n. 4 (1972); James 
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 440, 443, 456 (1995).  
Drawing bright-line distinctions between property and contract rights in bankruptcy can be problematic. 
See, e.g., Bussel, Equity in Bankruptcy, supra note 73, at 14–20 (advocating a balancing test for enforcement of 
specific performance rights that includes as a factor weighing against enforcement the contractual source of a 
claim and favoring finality in the conveyancing of property). Property rights, like contract rights, are commonly 
created or assigned by private agreement. Nevertheless, bankruptcy law (like other bodies of law) has long 
distinguished between property and contract rights and afforded bankruptcy courts lesser leeway to substantively 
alter property rights. U.S. v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 83–85 (1982); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. 
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588–89 (1935).  
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contractually alter or eliminate rights upon the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy or 
other financial condition defaults, even though such clauses are generally 
considered enforceable under nonbankruptcy law.109 Moreover, as a general 
proposition, orders of nonbankruptcy courts enjoining debtors from filing 
bankruptcy petitions are also unenforceable as void against public policy.110  
Although corporate debtors’ right to file a bankruptcy petition is 
nonwaivable, in Price v. Gurney,111 the Supreme Court also held that a dissident 
shareholder could not file a bankruptcy petition for the corporation under 
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 if state corporate law provided that 
only the directors had the power to authorize the filing of a petition.112 Consistent 
with Price, under state corporation law (and bankruptcy law), unless the 
corporation’s charter or bylaws provide otherwise, bankruptcy filings may be 
authorized by a resolution of the board of directors at a duly convened 
meeting.113 If there is a deadlocked board or a dispute, shareholders may call a 
special meeting to elect a new board of directors.114 The board holds the right to 
commence insolvency proceedings for the corporate debtor, a right that may not 
be waived by contract.115 
Creditors’ lawyers nevertheless have long attempted to evade the 
proscription on contractual waiver of corporate bankruptcy rights by obtaining 
control over the corporate decision to file bankruptcy without actually claiming 
outright control over the corporation, which might risk liability to third parties 
or equitable subordination of their clients’ claims.116 
 
 109 11 U.S.C. § 365(b), (e), (f) (overriding ipso facto defaults that would otherwise prevent assumption of 
contracts); § 541(c)(1)(A) (overriding ipso facto provisions that would otherwise cause the bankruptcy estate to 
forfeit property rights upon filing or conditions or restricts transfer); § 1124(2)(A) (authorizing reinstatement of 
claim notwithstanding incurable ipso facto default) (2019).  
 110 See In re Hollis, 150 B.R. 145, 147–48 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993); In re Surace, 52 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1985). 
 111 Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945).  
 112 See id. at 104, 106 (“[T]he initiation of the proceedings, like the run of corporate activities, is left to 
the corporation itself, i.e. to those who have the power of management . . . . If the District Court finds that those 
who purport to act on behalf of the corporation have not been granted authority by local law to institute the 
proceedings, it has no alternative but to dismiss the petition.”). 
 113 See Winter v. Bel-Aire Invs. (In re Bel-Aire Invs.) 97 B.R. 88, 90 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Am. 
Int’l Indus., Inc., 10 B.R. 695, 696–97 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). 
 114 See In re Acoustic Fibre Sound Sys., Inc., 20 B.R. 769, 777–78 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982). 
 115 See Gurney, 324 U.S. at 104; In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 435 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (“[A]ny attempt 
by a creditor in a private pre-bankruptcy agreement to opt out of the collective consequences of a debtor’s future 
bankruptcy filing is generally unenforceable. The Bankruptcy Code [extinguishes] the private right [of freedom] 
to contract around its essential provisions . . . .”). 
 116 A creditor holding a pledge of the corporation’s shares of voting stock and voting the shares to elect a 
new board of directors runs some of these risks. B Keenihan v. Heritage Press, Inc., 19 F.3d 1255, 1259 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to question validity of state court temporary restraining order 
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The most sophisticated techniques involve attempts to fetter the board’s 
prerogative of filing for bankruptcy. Examples include requiring the consent of 
an “independent” director appointed by the creditor to any bankruptcy filing, the 
issuance of a “golden share” of common equity, and requiring the consent of its 
holder (the creditor or an affiliate) to any bankruptcy filing.117 Bankruptcy courts 
sometimes refuse to honor these provisions if they believe the nonconsenting 
director or shareholder is failing to honor fiduciary duties to the corporation 
because of explicit or implicit understandings with a creditor that he will vote 
against a resolution to file a bankruptcy petition.118 Courts have also allowed 
 
precluding old officers and board of directors from filing a bankruptcy petition for corporation); see also In re 
Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. 258, 264 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (“Even so long ago as 1912, the 
United States Supreme Court was forced to address parties attempting to circumvent the bankruptcy laws by 
‘circuity of arrangement.’ Today’s resourceful attorneys have continued that tradition.”); see also Citicorp 
Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1998); Pepper 
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Citicorp Venture Capital v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured 
Claims (In re Papercraft Corp.), 211 B.R. 813 (W.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Citicorp, 160 F.3d at 982. 
 117 In re Intervention Energy, 553 B.R. at 262. 
 118 See In re Insight Terminal Solutions, LLC, No. 19-32231(1)(11), 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2949, at *10 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2019) (finding charter amendments requiring creditor/warrant holder consent to 
bankruptcy filing violate public policy); Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf, LLP v. Source Enters. (In re Source 
Enters.), 392 B.R. 541, 554–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re American Globus Corp., 195 B.R. 263, 265–66 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the bankruptcy could proceed despite the unanimity requirement and objection of 
the minority partner because the minority partner had violated his fiduciary duties and abrogated the unanimity 
requirement by himself ignoring the formalities required in the bylaws throughout the history of the LLC); cf. 
In re Kingston Square Assoc., 214 B.R. 713, 737–38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). But see In re Orchard at Hansen 
Park, LLC, 347 B.R. 822, 826–27 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). Interestingly, no court seems to have avoided 
“springing guarantees” of corporate debts that are conditioned on control persons not authorizing a bankruptcy 
filing of the corporation. Like the golden share, the springing guarantee could be analyzed as a contractual 
workaround against the proscription of advance waiver of bankruptcy. Moreover, it directly incentivizes breach 
of fiduciary duty in cases where the corporation may benefit from the protection of bankruptcy. Courts, 
nevertheless, have generally enforced bad boy guarantees triggered by bankruptcy filings or other equivalent 
events, such as an assignment for the benefit of creditors or generally not paying debts as they mature. See, e.g., 
In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (asserting that “public policy arguments 
relating to the guaranty claims [were] of minimal relevance” where principal liable under bad boy guarantee due 
to bankruptcy filing by borrower actually authorized the filing), aff’d, 435 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); G3-Purves 
St., LLC v. Thomson Purves, LLC, 101 A.D.3d 37, 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“contrary to the guarantors’ 
contention, the carve-out language in the loan agreement was unambiguous and provided for personal liability 
for a violation of certain enumerated exceptions, including defined ‘springing recourse events’”); First Nat’l 
Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assoc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“[t]he appellants are bound 
by the terms of the contract[,] and enforcement of the bankruptcy default clause is neither inequitable, 
oppressive, [nor] unconscionable”), appeal dismissed, 88 N.Y.2d 963 (1996); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 
Daniels, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Daniels, 2011-Ohio-6555, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he plain 
language of the guaranty agreements and the related agreements provided that Daniels and Baird would become 
liable for the entire indebtedness upon the occurrence of certain events, including the borrower filing a petition 
for bankruptcy” and that “[t]he agreements did not require the guarantors’ consent to, authorization of, or even 
knowledge about the filing of the bankruptcy petition in order to trigger their liability.”); see Marshall E. Tracht, 
Insider Guaranties in Bankruptcy: A Framework for Analysis, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 545–50 (2000); Nader 
Pakfar, Kelsey, et al. Securities Breach with the Return of CMBS, Attorneys for Borrowers Must Carefully 
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circumvention of contractual consent requirements limiting access to 
bankruptcy by validating the filing of a friendly involuntary petition instigated 
by some of the debtor’s insiders.119 
The Delaware bankruptcy court was the first court to confront the golden 
share technique in a published opinion. In Intervention Energy, it found the 
technique to be a thinly disguised contractual waiver of access to bankruptcy 
and refused to enforce it on public policy grounds.120 As a result of the creditor’s 
overreaching in the charter to impose special limitations on bankruptcy filing 
authority, the standard corporate governance rules embodied in the Delaware 
corporation code applied by default, a moderate and sensible result consistent 
with Price v. Gurney.121 In Franchise Services,122 however, the Fifth Circuit 
subsequently enforced a golden share provision also governed by Delaware law, 
distinguishing Intervention Energy on the ground that the holder in Franchise 
Services was a bona fide shareholder123 and not “a creditor [that] has somehow 
contracted for the right to prevent a bankruptcy where the equity interest is just 
a ruse.”124 The implication of Franchise Services, however, remains that if a 
creditor bargains for a golden share simply as a means of avoiding the 
prohibition on contractual bankruptcy waivers and is not otherwise a “bona fide 
shareholder,” the court will not enforce the golden shareholder consent 
requirement.125 
 
Examine the Nonrecourse Carveouts of Loan Agreements, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2016, at 18, 21. 
 119 See DeBold v. Case (In re Tri-River Trading, LLC), 329 B.R. 252, 266–67 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005); In 
re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 729–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to find bad faith filing 
even though debtor orchestrated the filing of the involuntary petition to evade corporate charter bankruptcy 
remote provisions). 
 120 In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. 258, 265–66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
 121 Id.; see also In re Insight Terminal Solutions, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2949, at *10 (finding charter 
amendments requiring creditor/warrant holder consent to bankruptcy filing violate public policy). 
 122 Franchise Servs. of N. Am. v. United States Trs. (In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am.), 891 F.3d 198, 203 
n.1 (5th Cir. 2018); see also In re Blue Chip Capital DC, LLC, 600 B.R. 735, 737 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2019) 
(dismissing chapter 11 case for cause without regard to contractual veto of filing exercised by creditor).  
 123 The golden shares in Franchise Services were preferred shares issued to an investor in exchange for 
$15 million. The preferred share investor also held debt with a face amount of $3 million. The Fifth Circuit 
viewed the preferred shares as an equity investment, hence its characterization of the investor as a bona fide 
shareholder. Of course, the line between debt and equity is a notoriously thin one and preferred stock straddles 
the line. Preferred stock of well-capitalized firms functions as a debt-equivalent, particularly when it carries 
mandatory redemption or conversion to debt features. See generally Kenneth A. Carow & John J. McConnell, A 
Survey of U.S. Corporate Financing Innovations 1970–1997, 12.1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55 (1999). Viewed in 
this light, it is at best unclear whether the Fifth Circuit was correct in honoring the golden share feature of the 
preferred shareholder’s contract as embodied in the corporate charter.  
 124 In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc., 891 F.3d at 203 n.1.  
 125 In addition to the golden share, there are a plethora of other devices and strategies lenders use that are 
designed to encumber a debtor’s right to bankruptcy relief. To name a few examples, lenders may require that 
the borrower be structured as a bankruptcy-remote vehicle apart from the main business; the lender may require 
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The bankruptcy policy supporting the longstanding prohibition of pre-
petition bankruptcy waivers directly applies to attempts to contractually vary 
corporate governance rules to prohibit voluntary bankruptcy filings without 
creditor consent. Indeed, any set of contractual arrangements with the 
substantive effect of requiring the consent of a creditor or its designated 
representative to a voluntary corporate bankruptcy filing, whether in the 
creditor’s debt contract or baked into the corporate charter, should run afoul of 
the public policy prohibiting advance waiver of access to bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy at its core is a procedure for dealing with business failure on an ex-
post collective basis that binds dissenters. It is fundamentally inconsistent with 
the basic decision to make such a procedure available on a debtor’s petition to 
allow a dissenting creditor to unilaterally veto the collective process. Rather, the 
dissenter should assert its substantive objections to its treatment and other 
substantive rights within the framework of the statutory procedure.126 The 
golden share (and its ilk) is too clever by half. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION OF AFFILIATED CORPORATE ENTITIES 
Substantive consolidation is a bankruptcy doctrine of corporate disregard 
commonly applied within insolvent corporate groups.127 In a substantive 
consolidation, the assets and liabilities of the consolidated entities are pooled 
while intercompany and duplicate claims (including guarantees of consolidated 
affiliates’ debts) are extinguished.128 Importantly, however, security interests 
 
that “independent” (read: creditor-interested) directors serve on the board and ensure that bankruptcy can only 
proceed with that director’s permission; the lender may require insertion of “Bad Boy Guaranty” provisions, see 
supra note 116; the lender may try to restrict the bankruptcy venue or limit it to only certain chapters of the 
Code, making a successful bankruptcy an unlikely prospect; and the lender may require any variety of pre-
petition waivers in order to make bankruptcy more difficult. See generally Harold Novikoff, et al., Bankruptcy 
Remote Vehicles and Bankruptcy Waivers, SG001 ALI-ABA 97 (2001); see also Tracht, supra note 116. 
 126 But see Steven Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
515, 584–85 (1999). 
 127 The root of the doctrine in United States insolvency law is usually identified as Sampsell v. Imperial 
Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941). The Second Circuit played an important role in the development of 
the doctrine under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Flora Mir Candy Corp. v. R.S. Dickson & Co. (In re Flora Mir 
Candy Corp.), 432 F.2d 1060, 1062–63 (2d Cir. 1970); Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 846–
47 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Charles Seligson & Charles F. Mandel, Multi-Debtor Petition—Consolidation of 
Debtors and Due Process of Law, 73 COMMERCIAL L.J. 341, 341–42 (1968). I leave to one side the increasingly 
pressing problem of the multinational corporate group subject to concurrent insolvency proceedings in different 
nations governed by substantively different national insolvency laws. The solution to the perplexing insolvent 
multinational group puzzle may well be an international regime favoring substantive consolidation governed by 
the law of the parent corporation’s center of main interests. But the nations of the world are a very long way 
from agreeing to such a regime ex-ante, although ex-post negotiated protocols or settlements in individual cases 
may approximate such a solution.  
 128 Woburn Assocs. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1992) 
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and other rights in property are not avoided in a consolidation, except, of course 
to the extent that the collateral for a secured claim or other interest in property 
is an intercompany debt, lease, or equity interest that is extinguished in the 
consolidation.129 Most courts traditionally held that both filed and non-filed 
affiliates may be consolidated in bankruptcy,130 as indeed occurred in some of 
the earliest and best-known cases.131 Post-consolidation, secured claims remain 
protected in bankruptcy to the extent of the collateral's value; they are not, 
however, immune from restructuring or alteration. 
Substantive consolidation is a judicially created equitable doctrine that 
antedates the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.132 To the extent there is 
express recognition of substantive consolidation in the current Bankruptcy 
Code, it resides either in bankruptcy’s “all writs” statute,133 or, in the chapter 11 
 
(distinguishing substantive consolidation from joint administration and noting that “substantive consolidation 
merges the assets and liabilities of the debtor entities into a unitary debtor estate”); Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847. 
 129 Sampsell, 313 U.S. at 220–21 (distinguishing rights of bona fide lien creditor).  
 130 See id. at 219; Patrick C. Sargent, Bankruptcy Remote Finance Subsidiaries: The Substantive 
Consolidation Issue, 44 BUS. LAWYER 1223, 1233–36 (1989) (discussing case law supporting consolidation of 
non-debtor affiliates). A recent example is Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. 
Appx. 946, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2017) (consolidating debtor limited liability company with its sole member a non-
debtor family trust). 
 131 See Sampsell, 313 U.S. at 218 (consolidating non-filed corporate transferee of individual bankrupt 
debtor’s assets with individual bankrupt debtor’s estate because “[m]ere legal paraphernalia will not suffice to 
transform into a substantial adverse claimant a corporation whose affairs are so closely assimilated to the affairs 
of the dominant stockholder that in substance it is little more than his corporate pocket.”). Notwithstanding the 
older authorities supporting the consolidation of non-debtor entities, some recent decisions find that non-debtor 
consolidation is beyond the authority of the bankruptcy court. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. 
Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis (In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis), 888 F.3d 944, 954 
(8th Cir. 2018) (finding that statutory limitation on involuntary filing of non-profit entities precludes non-debtor 
consolidation); Audette v. Kasemir (In re Concepts Am., Inc.), Nos. 14 B 34232, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1324, at 
*15 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 3, 2018). Some courts recognizing non-debtor consolidation in theory practically limit 
the availability of non-debtor consolidation by imposing onerous notice requirements. Leslie v. Mihranian (In 
re Mihranian), No. CC-17-1048-KuSA, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4124, at *4 (9th Cir. B.A.P. Dec. 4, 2017); SE 
Property Holdings LLC v. Stewart (In re Stewart), No. 15-12215-JDL, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2339, at *4, 5 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ok. Aug. 17, 2017); see also Thomas J. McElhinney, A Bankruptcy Litigation Framework for Series LLC 
Eligibility, Property of the Estate, and Substantive Consolidation, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 151 (2019) 
(applying substantive consolidation doctrine to Series LLC).  
 132 See Douglas Baird, Substantive Consolidation Today, 47 BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 5, 15–16 (2005); J. 
Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano and the Death of Substantive Consolidation, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
427, 426, 428 (2000). There are historical and conceptual ties among substantive consolidation, veil-piercing, 
fraudulent transfer and recharacterization doctrines and these related bodies of law often work together, or 
separately, to limit withdrawal rights and entity partitions, and impose enterprise liability within corporate 
groups, corporate parent shareholders, or, in some cases particularly with respect to fraudulent transfer cases, 
third parties. The discussion here, however, focuses particularly on the application of substantive consolidation 
doctrine.  
 133 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2019) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”). 
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context, as a means of implementing a plan of reorganization.134 The leading 
academic work on substantive consolidation is that of Mary Beth Kors135 and 
William Widen.136 Kors and Widen come at the subject from competing 
perspectives. 
Kors’ view is that nonconsensual substantive consolidation is a limited 
doctrine that should be rarely invoked and only in exceptional circumstances: 
(1) where there is no prejudice to any objecting party, or (2) where consolidation 
is a practical necessity because assets and liabilities are so scrambled amongst 
the entities within the corporate group that separate assignment to individual 
members of the group is impossible.137 
The Widen view is that substantive consolidation is and should be a 
relatively common response when it reflects the actual operations of an insolvent 
corporate group.138 The doctrine is particularly useful in avoiding battles over 
an arbitrary multiplication of claims based on principles of co-liability and 
suretyship law, and the treatment of intercompany accounts and claims based on 
the transfer of assets that regularly occurs in corporate group cases.139 
 
 134 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (2019) (“Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a 
plan shall—(5) provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, such as—(C) merger or consolidation of 
the debtor with one or more persons . . . .”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2019) (“‘person’ includes individual, 
partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit . . . .”). Interestingly, the exclusion of 
governmental unit from the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “person” may suggest that substantive 
consolidation may not occur except in compliance with otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law in a chapter 9 
case. There does not appear to be any precedents for nonconsensual substantive consolidation that is not 
authorized by law in the municipal bankruptcy cases. Some commentators have suggested that some of the 
Supreme Court’s recent case law demanding express statutory predicates for the exercise of traditional equitable 
powers may undermine the legal basis for substantive consolidation. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 132, at 434; 
Rachel A. Greenleaf, Is Substantive Consolidation a Viable Cause of Action Post-Law?, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., Dec. 2018 at 54; Hon. Christopher D. Jaime, Objections to Exemptions Under State Law After Law v. Siegel, 
36 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2017 at 14. But the Supreme Court has never rejected the substantive consolidation 
doctrine directly or suggested that its own prior caselaw embracing the doctrine has been overruled sub silentio, 
and the doctrine continues to be regularly employed in the lower courts, subject to the varying standards 
discussed in the text.  
 135 See Kors, supra note 3; see also Timothy E. Graulich, Substantive Consolidation—A Post-Modern 
Trend, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 527 (2006); Baird, Substantive Consolidation, supra note 132. 
 136 See Widen, Corporate Form, supra note 3; see also Widen, Report, supra note 3. 
 137 Kors, supra note 3, at 451. 
 138 See Widen, Corporate Form, supra note 3, at 251–53, 323–24. 
 139 See Daniel J. Bussel, Multiple Claims, Ivanhoe and Substantive Consolidation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV 217, 226–30 (2010); Widen, Corporate Form, supra note 3, at 281–84, 343–44; see also In re Falls 
Event Ctr. LLC, 600 B.R. 857, 868, 870 (Bankr. D. Utah 2019) (“[T]he Falls Parties are controlled by common 
management and they have no economic existence separate and apart from each other . . . . The Falls Parties’ 
affairs are so entangled with those of TFEC that it would be most efficient to consolidate them . . . .”). 
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Both views are reflected in modern case law. The Widen view finds 
expression in such cases as Auto-Train140 and Eastgroup141 and the large number 
of bankruptcy court decisions confirming consolidated reorganization plans.142 
These courts express the test for substantive consolidation as essentially a 
generalized balancing test weighing the advantages and harms of consolidation. 
Kors is embraced in Owens-Corning143 which in turn is critiqued by Widen. In 
the Courts of Appeals,144 the law reviews,145 and in the rarefied world of the 
writers and consumers of non-consolidation opinions,146 Kors seems to be 
winning the debate. Courts in her camp generally express the legal test for 
substantive consolidation as a two-prong analysis developed by the Second 
Circuit in Augie-Restivo.147 This legal test requires that the proponent 
demonstrate either a hopeless commingling of assets of liabilities that leaves the 
court with no practical alternative to consolidation or a lack of reliance on entity 
separateness by any objecting party. 
As William Widen has pointed out,148 it is somewhat ironic that Owens-
Corning has become the leading modern case authority in the two-prong line. In 
Owens-Corning, the banks successfully opposing substantive consolidation 
plainly did not rely on the financial condition of any individual entity, but rather 
viewed Owens-Corning as a consolidated enterprise in making their credit 
decision. They made their credit decision on the basis of consolidated financials 
only,149 and moreover demanded a web of guarantees from the members of the 
consolidated group to ensure that all the assets of the group members were 
available to satisfy their obligations regardless of which entity was the owner.150 
The Third Circuit, somewhat perversely, viewed the subsidiary guarantees as 
evidence of bank reliance on structural seniority at the subsidiary level rather 
 
 140 Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 141 Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 142 See generally Widen, Report, supra note 3, at 1. 
 143 In re Owens-Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 144 See Spradlin v. Beads & Steeds Inns, LLC (In re Howland), 674 Fed. Appx. 482, 488–89 (6th Cir. 
2017); In re Lisanti Foods, Inc., 241 Fed. Appx. 1 (3d Cir. 2007); FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 59 
(2d Cir. 1992). 
 145 See Graulich, Post-Modern Trend, supra note 135; Baird, Substantive Consolidation, supra note 132. 
 146 See Richard D. Jones & Richard A. Bendit, Practical Advice on the Preparation of the Substantive 
Non-Consolidation Opinion in Real Estate Transactions, SF88 Am. Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass’n 375, 387 (2001); 
see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 14 (2006); E. Kristen Moye, Non-Consolidation and True Sale/Transfer Opinions in Securitized Real Estate 
Loan Transactions, 21(3) PRAC. REAL EST. LAW 7 (2005). 
 147 In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 148 See Widen, Corporate Form, supra note 3, at 264–65. 
 149 In re Owens-Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 213 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 150 Id. at 212–13. 
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than evidence that the banks were making an enterprise-based loan to the group 
as a whole supported by the entire pool of assets, regardless of which pocket 
within the group held title to the assets.151 
A primary objection to Widen’s more liberal view of substantive 
consolidation is a perception that substantive consolidation creates an 
undesirable discontinuity between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy rules of 
decision. The proceduralist view of bankruptcy first advanced by Professor 
Jackson152 insists that substantive entitlements should not be affected by 
bankruptcy except to the extent necessary to translate those entitlements into the 
form of a collective proceeding. Jackson and his many academic disciples argue 
that altering substantive entitlements leads to “forum shopping”—that is, 
bankruptcy filings that are motivated by a given constituent’s desire to obtain 
the benefit of the more favorable bankruptcy rule rather than to solve collective 
action problems.153 
How ironic that substantive consolidation motivated to redress and preclude 
assertion of “withdrawal rights” and duplicative claims by those who have 
caused or exploited the debtor’s hiving off assets into separate subsidiaries draw 
this proceduralist objection!154 Substantive consolidation in these circumstances 
solves a collective action problem caused by those who want to avoid collective 
process by opting out of the bankruptcy proceeding or by manipulating its 
collective execution rules to their advantage. 
Passing over this irony, bankruptcy consolidation involving insolvent 
entities, even if it is substantive, does not actually represent a discontinuity 
between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law rules of decision. Nonbankruptcy 
corporate governance rules expressly contemplate that the standard 
arrangements will shift as the corporation becomes insolvent.155 Indeed, 
nonbankruptcy law acknowledges that when formal insolvency proceedings 
 
 151 Id. at 212. 
 152 See JACKSON, supra note 32, at 7–19; Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, 
and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 857–60 (1982). 
 153 See Thomas H. Jackson, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the 
Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 162 (1989). 
 154 See generally Widen, Corporate Form, supra note 3; J. Maxwell Tucker, Substantive Consolidation: 
The Cacophony Continues, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 89 (2010); In re Owens-Corning, 419 F.3d at 212. 
 155 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (2019) (providing for appointment of state law receiver for insolvent 
corporation); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Fleet Retail Fin. Grp. (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. 
of Del.), 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D. Del. 2002); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns. Corp., No. 
12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 (“At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of 
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the 
corporate enterprise.”). 
BUSSELPROOFS_4.30.20 5/3/2020 3:56 PM 
126 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
commence the nonbankruptcy regime is displaced by insolvency law rules that 
bring the protection of nonshareholder interests to the fore.156 
In defending his proceduralist vision of bankruptcy law, Professor Jackson 
specifically approved of the law of preferences to the extent that it operated to 
control preferred creditors’ opt-out behavior by reaching back into the 
prebankruptcy period and avoiding transfers, lawful and valid at the time they 
were made, that undermined the bankruptcy pro rata distribution scheme.157 The 
exigency of protecting the collective proceeding from individual creditor opt-
out justified the recharacterization of lawful transactions effected on the eve of 
bankruptcy as unlawful preferences.158 
More recently, Professor Westbrook has on a similar basis argued that asset 
partitioning functions as a secret lien and that entity disregard may be an 
appropriate response to undisclosed, nontransparent asset partition.159 Although 
Westbrook and I identify a similar problem, Westbrook’s limited 
recommendation is to require disclosure of an enterprise’s entire corporate 
structure so creditors can more fully appreciate risk.160 Certainly, disclosure is 
independently desirable. A concealed or secret withdrawal right is potentially 
subject to greater abuse than an open and notorious one. Disclosure, however, 
does not address the fundamental conflict between a collective proceeding and 
the existence of contract-based “withdrawal rights.” Secrecy or transparency is 
not the appropriate touchstone of the enforceability of a contractual “withdrawal 
right;” the touchstone should be whether the right is fundamentally destructive 
of the collective wealth maximization and rehabilitative purposes of the 
collective proceeding.161 
No one suggests that bankruptcy courts should order substantive 
consolidation as a matter of course without advancing some collective interest 
recognized in the insolvency proceeding and weighing the equities of those 
 
 156 See Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945) (“The law by the great weight of authority seems 
to be settled that when a corporation becomes insolvent . . . the officers and directors no longer represent the 
stockholders, but by the fact of insolvency, become trustees for the creditors . . . .”); see also Pepper v. Litton, 
308 U.S. 295, 307–08 (1939). 
 157 See Jackson, Nature of Bankruptcy, supra note 153, at 170; see also Daniel J. Bussel, The Problem 
With Preferences, 100 IOWA L. REV. 11, 14–17 (2014) (discussing policies underlying preference law); Thomas 
H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 757 (1984).  
 158 Jackson, Avoiding Powers, supra note 157, at 757–60. 
 159 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Transparency in Corporate Groups, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 33 
(2018).  
 160 Id. at 52. 
 161 For the avoidance of doubt, Professor Westbrook clearly acknowledges that disclosure is a starting 
point and not a complete solution to the problem of asset partitioning. Id. at 36. 
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prejudiced by consolidation.162 But neither should there be any bias against 
protecting the collective interest over the objection of a creditor who simply 
prefers to retain the advantage conferred by manipulating corporate governance 
or entity structures to avoid playing by insolvency rules.163 Bankruptcy law, 
while generally respecting the value of non-debtor property rights, may override 
individual creditors’ procedural and contractual nonbankruptcy rights to opt out 
of the proceeding in the service of bankruptcy’s collective execution process. 
IV. SECURITIZING CORPORATE ASSETS 
A. Securitization Today 
Two landmark Reports of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York,164 identify the “one central, core principle” of asset securitization: “a 
defined group of assets can be structurally isolated, and thus serve as the basis 
of a financing that is independent . . . from the bankruptcy risks of the 
[originator] of the assets.”165 The proponents of asset securitization argue that 
by transferring assets to a trust or limited liability company that engages in no 
business activity other than the ownership and management of segregated assets, 
the transferred assets are removed from the transferor’s estate. If a court 
concludes that the transaction is a “true sale,” it will honor this characterization 
and treat the assets as bankruptcy remote—that is, as beyond the reach of a 
bankruptcy of the transferor.166 Credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s have agreed to rate securities issued by these trusts or 
limited liability companies based on the quality and value of the assets 
transferred rather than the general credit of the transferor.167 This enables a 
transferor with, say, a single A credit rating to obtain financing at AA rates by 
segregating assets into “bankruptcy remote vehicles.”  
 
 162 See In re Abeinsa Holding, Inc. 562 B.R. 265, 281 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (“The partial substantive 
consolidation in the Plans is not an imprecise lumping of assets and creditors together, but the result of careful 
analysis of ownership, operational entanglements, and creditor expectations . . . .”). 
 163 See, e.g., In re ADPT DFW Holdings, LLC, 574 B.R. 87, 107 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2017) (holding that 
140 separate legal entities should be substantively consolidated over the objection of a disputed unsecured 
creditor). 
 164 See New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 BUS. LAW. 95 (2000); Structured Financing 
Techniques, supra note 8, at 527. 
 165 New Developments in Structured Finance, supra note 164, at 101; Structured Financing Techniques, 
supra note 8, at 529.  
 166 See Moye, supra note 146, at 8. 
 167 See MOODY’S INV’R SERV., BANKR. REMOTENESS CRITERIA FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES IN 
GLOBAL STRUCTURED FIN. TRANSACTIONS (2014); S&P GLOBAL RATINGS, STRUCTURED FIN.: ASSET 
ISOLATION AND SPECIAL-PURPOSE ENTITY METHODOLOGY (2017). 
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The originator’s bankruptcy-disabled subsidiary or trust is described as a 
“bankruptcy remote vehicle” or a “special purpose entity.” Securitized debt 
carries a lower interest rate than non-securitized secured borrowings supported 
by the same collateral. Although rating agencies, bankers, and lawyers 
promoting securitization make vague claims of efficiency arising from the 
segregation of collateral into bankruptcy remote vehicles to support debt 
issues,168 the lower borrowing costs associated with this financing appear to be 
solely a function of the bankruptcy opt-out feature of the transaction.169 Rating 
agency and financial market acceptance of a securitization require legal opinions 
that conclude bankruptcy remoteness of the securitization vehicle will be 
respected.170 In particular, marketable securitizations require legal opinions that 
(1) the collateral has been transferred to the entity in a “true-sale” and is no 
longer property of the originator,171 and (2) bankruptcy courts will not 
consolidate the “bankruptcy-remote” securitization vehicle with the originator’s 
bankruptcy estate, should the originator commence bankruptcy proceedings.172 
The overall global market for securitized debt is of staggering dimensions. 
Total outstanding securitized debt exceeds $6 trillion. In the United States alone, 
annual new issuances in recent years were $436 billion (2015), $373 billion 
(2016), $510 billion (2017), and $531 billion (2018).173 Preliminary indications 
suggest the 2019 pace may equal or exceed that of 2018.174 
The vast majority of this debt, however, does not involve non-financial 
corporate originators securitizing core operating assets.175 
 
 168 See Stephen Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 134–35 
(1994). 
 169 See id. at 151; see also Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of 
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1569 (2008) (“Substantially all of the benefits 
claimed for securitization are nothing more than consequences of the structure’s purported avoidance of the 
Bankruptcy Tax . . . .”). 
 170 See, e.g., The Comm. of Structured Fin. and the Comm. on Bankr. and Corp. Reorganization, Ass’n of 
the Bar of N.Y.C., Special Report on the Preparation of Substantive Consolidation Opinions, 64 BUS. LAW. 411, 
416–18 (2009); MOODY’S INV’R SERV., BANKR. REMOTENESS CRITERIA FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES IN 
GLOBAL STRUCTURED FIN. TRANSACTIONS 2–4 (2014) (requesting legal opinions that indicate satisfaction of 
several structuring criteria); S&P GLOBAL RATINGS, STRUCTURED FIN.: ASSET ISOLATION AND SPECIAL-
PURPOSE ENTITY METHODOLOGY 8 (2017) (“We may look to a non-consolidation opinion to derive comfort 
regarding [the risk of substantive consolidation] when assessing insolvency remoteness.”). 
 171 See Special Report on the Preparation of Substantive Consolidation Opinions, supra note 170, at 412–
13. 
 172 See id. at 416–18. 
 173 S&P GLOBAL RATINGS, GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE 2019 SECURITIZATION ENERGIZED WITH $1 T 
IN VOLUME at 4, Table 1 (Jan. 7, 2019).  
 174 See generally id. 
 175 I have attached a brief Appendix to this Article sketching out data and trends in the issuance of the 
BUSSELPROOFS_4.30.20 5/3/2020 3:56 PM 
2020] CONSOLIDATION IN BANKRUPTCY 129 
The securitization markets undercutting the proper functioning of chapter 11 
and most directly implicating the “withdrawal rights” identified by LoPucki, 
Baird, and Casey are still, fortunately, a much smaller universe. That universe 
principally consists of the markets for single-borrower, single-asset commercial 
mortgage backed securities (CMBS), and the market for securitization of 
equipment, transportation fleets, and floorplan financing. However, we are also 
observing increasing securitization of operating receivables in a variety of 
industries. The following figures illustrate the magnitude of the potential 
problem and its growth over time. Figure 1 collects the data on new 
securitization issuances over the last thirty years broken down into eight 
categories of financing used by non-financial operating companies. The 
categories are: general equipment financings, transportation equipment (with 
trucks, railcars, auto fleets, and aircraft separately broken out), floorplan 
arrangements for dealers, receivables financings (separately broken by sector 




broader securitization market for interested readers. 
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Figure 1: Non-financial commercial securitization issuances 
1988–2018 ($ billions)176 
As Figure 1 makes clear, these categories of securitizations remain small 
relative to the overall securitization market, and their growth from de minimis 
levels prior to 1993 has been cyclical. New issuances in these categories first 
peaked in 2001 at over $40 billion, shrank to $20 billion in the 2002 recession, 
returned to the $30–40 billion level before the 2008 financial crisis, collapsed 
completely in the financial crisis, and then grew steadily to a new peak in 2017 
of over $50 billion. 
 
 
 176 The ABS Database, ASSET-BACKED ALERT, HARRISON SCOTT PUBLICATIONS, https://www.abalert. 
com/db/absdb.pl (last visited Aug. 6, 2019). The entire database is available to subscribers for download at the 
above link. The categories represented in Figure 1 are aggregations of issuances coded with the following 
collateral codes: (1) Auto-Fleet Leases (AF); (2) Energy (NR, RE); (3) Equipment (EQ, EL), (4) Floorplan Loans 
(FP); (5) Franchises and Trade Receivables (FF, FL, WB, TR, RO); (6) Ground & Sea Transport (TU, RC, SH, 
TP); (7) Air Transport (AC, AK); (8) Utilities (UT, CT); and (9) Miscellaneous (WS, PF, RE, TO, EZ). A full 
list of collateral codes and more information about the ABS Database is available at About the ABS Database, 
ASSET-BACKED ALERT, HARRISON SCOTT PUBLICATIONS, https://www.abalert.com/market/about_db.pl (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2019). The author thanks Asset-Backed Alert for generously providing complimentary limited-
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Single-asset single-borrower commercial real estate securitizations, shown 
below in Figure 2, while also fluctuating with the business cycle, demonstrate a 
stronger secular growth trend peaking at over $35 billion in 2017. 
 
 
Figure 2: SASB CMBS Issuances 1996–2018177 
Inevitably, the growth of these markets means that bankruptcy judges and 
lawyers in operating chapter 11 cases will increasingly encounter reorganizing 
firms that have funded their operations through special purpose affiliates. 
Application of substantive consolidation and recharacterization doctrines to this 
growing form of financing will become increasingly salient in the next round of 
financial distress, particularly if that round of financial distress heavily involves 
the transportation sector or a sector that relies on securitization in lieu of 
traditional receivables financing. 
B. LTV and General Growth 
In the context of the securitization of pools of consumer obligations by 
financial intermediaries, the characterization of the structured finance 
transaction as a true sale makes a good bit of sense. This sort of structured 
finance transaction effectively amounts to the transfer of a pool of mortgage 
 
 177 U.S. Mortgage-Related Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.sifma.org/ 
resources/research/us-mortgage-related-issuance-and-outstanding. The entire database is freely available for 
download at the above URL address in Excel format. The data appearing in Figure 2 can be found in the Tab 
titled “Non-Agency Issuance,” and the Column titled “Single-Asset/Single-Borrower.”  
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loans or other consumer debt obligations from the financial originator to a set of 
investors who then bear the risks of ownership of those assets. But the true sale 
character of a transaction involving the segregation of core operating assets of a 
functioning business into an affiliated financing subsidiary on its face involves 
a far different set of considerations. Here, the originator is not merely selling off 
self-liquidating assets to investors but effectively obtaining its working capital 
from secured lenders who seek to insulate themselves from the business risks 
associated with these core operating assets. Arrangements of this sort famously 
failed their first courtroom encounter with the realities of bankruptcy in In re 
LTV Steel Company.178 
In LTV, the bankruptcy debtor, LTV Steel Co. (LTV), was one of the largest 
legacy manufacturers of integrated steel products in the United States, 
employing 17,500 people and providing medical coverage and other benefits to 
approximately 100,000 retirees and their dependents. LTV successfully emerged 
from a prior chapter 11 in 1993.179 
Abbey National was a financial institution located in the United Kingdom.180 
Following its previous reorganization, LTV and Abbey National entered into its 
first securitization transaction in October 1994 as a substitute for a traditional 
secured working capital credit facility collateralized by its accounts receivable 
from the sale of steel products.181 To effectuate this agreement, LTV created a 
wholly-owned subsidiary known as LTV Sales Finance Co. (Sales Finance).182 
LTV then entered into an agreement with Sales Finance which purported to sell 
all of LTV’s rights and interests in its accounts receivables to Sales Finance on 
a continuing basis.183 Abbey National then agreed to loan $270,000,000.00 to 
Sales Finance in exchange for Sales Finance granting Abbey National a security 
interest in the receivables.184 On the date LTV filed its petition, Chase Manhattan 
Bank was Abbey National’s agent for this credit facility.185 
In 1998, LTV entered into another securitization financing arrangement.186 
To that end, LTV created LTV Steel Products, LLC (Steel Products), another 
 
 178 In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 179 Id. at 279–80. 
 180 Spain’s Santander Group acquired Abbey National in 2004. See Mark Mulligan, Santander Profits 
Driven by Abbey Acquisition, FIN. TIMES (July 25, 2005), https://www.ft.com/content/b0eae68c-fe85-11d9-
94b4-00000e2511c8.  
 181 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 280. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id.  
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
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wholly-owned subsidiary.187 LTV entered into an agreement with Steel Products 
which purported to sell all of LTV’s right, title, and interest in its inventory to 
Steel Products on a continuing basis.188 Chase Manhattan and several other 
banking institutions then agreed to loan $30,000,000.00 to Steel Products in 
exchange for a security interest in Steel Products’ inventory.189 Abbey National 
was not involved in this asset-backed securitization facility, and it had no interest 
in pre-petition inventory allegedly owned by Steel Products.190 
Neither Sales Finance nor Steel Products filed for chapter 11 relief when 
LTV encountered a need for further chapter 11 relief in 2000.191 Nevertheless, 
when LTV filed its petition for relief it moved the court for an interim order 
permitting it to use cash collateral.192 This cash collateral consisted of the 
receivables and inventory that are ostensibly owned by Sales Finance and Steel 
Products.193 LTV stated to the court that it would be forced to shut its doors and 
cease operations if it did not receive authorization to use this cash collateral.194 
A hearing was held on LTV’s cash collateral motion on December 29, 2000 as 
part of the first day hearings.195 Abbey National was not present at the cash 
collateral hearing but LTV and Chase Manhattan reached an agreement 
regarding an interim order permitting LTV to use the cash collateral.196 Chase 
Manhattan did not formally consent to the entry of this order, as it could not 
secure Abbey National’s consent to the form of the order, but Chase Manhattan 
did negotiate some of the terms of the order and did not raise an objection to its 
entry by the court.197 The court determined that entry of the interim order was 
necessary to permit LTV to continue business operations, that the interests of 
Abbey National and all other creditors who had an interest in the cash collateral 
were adequately protected by the order, and that entry of the order was in the 
best interests of the estate and creditors of the estate.198 Accordingly, the court 
entered a use of cash collateral order affording Abbey National and the other 
holders of securitized obligations the protections typically afforded a senior 
 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id.  
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id.  
 196 Id. at 280–81. 
 197 Id. at 281. 
 198 Id.  
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secured lender holding first liens in the debtor’s inventory and accounts 
receivable.199 
Abbey National sought to modify this order, arguing there was no basis for 
the court to determine that the receivables, which were Abbey National’s 
collateral, were property of LTV’s bankruptcy estate.200 It contended that the 
transaction between LTV and Sales Finance was properly characterized as a true 
sale.201 
The bankruptcy court rejected this request for modification writing: 
Furthermore, there seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest 
that [LTV] does not retain at least an equitable interest in the property 
that is subject to the interim order. [LTV]’s business requires it to 
purchase, melt, mold and cast various metal products. To suggest that 
[LTV] lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with 
its own labor, as well as the proceeds to be derived from that labor, is 
difficult to accept. Accordingly, the Court concludes that [LTV] has at 
least some equitable interest in the inventory and receivables, and that 
this interest is property of [LTV]’s estate. This equitable interest is 
sufficient to support the entry of the interim cash collateral order. 
Finally, it is readily apparent that granting Abbey National relief 
from the interim cash collateral order would be highly inequitable. The 
Court is satisfied that the entry of the interim order was necessary to 
enable [LTV] to keep its doors open and continue to meet its 
obligations to its employees, retirees, customers and creditors. 
Allowing Abbey National to modify the order would allow Abbey 
National to enforce its state law rights as a secured lender to look to 
the collateral in satisfaction of this debt. This circumstance would put 
an immediate end to [LTV]’s business, would put thousands of people 
out of work, would deprive 100,000 retirees of needed medical 
benefits, and would have more far reaching economic effects on the 
geographic areas where [LTV] does business. However, maintaining 
the current status quo permits [LTV] to remain in business while it 
searches for substitute financing, and adequately protects and 
preserves Abbey National’s rights. The equities of this situation highly 
favor [LTV]. As a result, the Court declines to exercise its discretion 
to modify the interim order . . . .202 
 
 199 Id. at 281–82. 
 200 Id. at 282. 
 201 Id. at 284. 
 202 Id. at 285–86. 
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After the bankruptcy court decision in LTV, the cash collateral litigation settled 
before a final order was entered on the question of the “true sale” nature of the 
securitization. LTV prompted great angst in the securitization industry, which 
worried that the court’s nonruling drew into question the “true sale” status of 
securitizations of all kinds.203 Subsequent attempts to override LTV by statute 
failed in the wake of the public outcry surrounding Enron Corporation’s abuse 
of off-balance sheet financing through its own special purpose entities.204 
The robustness of the structural isolation of assets in bankruptcy remote 
vehicles was again tested in General Growth Properties.205 The lead debtor—
General Growth Properties (GGP)—was one of the Nation’s largest real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), owning and operating more than two hundred 
commercial shopping centers across forty-four states.206 GGP controlled 
numerous “bankruptcy-remote” subsidiaries structured as special purpose 
entities that held commercial real estate financed by securitized mortgages.207 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, GGP failed to secure refinancing of its 
substantial and maturing debts.208 Many of GGP’s subsidiaries, however, were 
in good financial health with excess cash flow.209 On the eve of bankruptcy, the 
debtor replaced the “independent directors” of numerous subsidiaries; the newly 
constituted boards then joined in the chapter 11 filing.210 The subsidiaries’ 
creditors objected, arguing that the legal separateness of the special purpose 
entities ensured their exclusion from bankruptcy proceedings of the parent 
corporation.211 The bankruptcy court denied motions to dismiss the subsidiary 
cases as either unauthorized (because of the failure to obtain the required 
independent director’s consent) or in bad faith.212 After rejecting those 
challenges, the bankruptcy court subsequently authorized cash management, use 
of cash collateral, and debtor-in-possession financing on a consolidated basis.213 
While hardly a complete substantive consolidation, these actions collectively 
constituted a significant inroad on the concept of structural isolation and 
 
 203 See Kettering, supra note 169, at 1558–69 (2008); see also Heather Hughes, Property and the True-
Sale Doctrine, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 870, 900 (2017). 
 204 See Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or Dormant? 11 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101, 115–16 (2002). 
 205 In re General Growth Prop. Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 206 Id. at 47. 
 207 Id. at 48, 61. 
 208 Id. at 53. 
 209 Id. at 55. 
 210 Id. at 68. 
 211 Id. at 61–62. 
 212 Id. at 71–72. 
 213 Id. at 55.  
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underscore the legal infirmity of formal barriers to bankruptcy relief for 
“bankruptcy remote” entities in exigent circumstances. 
C. Assessing Securitization of the Core Assets of a Non-Financial Operating 
Company 
Notwithstanding the enormous volumes of the securitization of financial 
assets in order to fund the lending operations of financial institutions, we still 
remain thirty years in, at the threshold of widespread securitization of operating 
companies’ core assets. Experimentation across different industries and asset 
types is taking place and volume is increasing.214 The foundations of these 
securitizations and entity partitions among affiliated corporations and 
bankruptcy-remoteness remain vulnerable to the substance-over-form logic of 
bankruptcy, especially if the assets securitized are core assets of a nonfinancial 
operating company. The economic goal of the securitization technique is to 
segregate assets for the benefit of a particular investor and insulate those assets 
from bankruptcy risk. That objective is antithetical to effective bankruptcy relief 
when involving core operating assets of nonfinancial firms. In this context, the 
foundations of securitization are truly rotten.215 Lawyers, bankers, raters, courts, 
and scholars should not pretend otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy courts are destined to struggle with the problem of withdrawal 
rights forever. Powerful creditors have never fully accepted the concept that they 
can be compelled to participate in a collective proceeding in the event of the 
common debtor’s insolvency and have sought ways to opt out of those 
proceedings when it is to their advantage to do so. They show no signs of giving 
up (increasingly convoluted) efforts to structure bankruptcy-remote relations, 
through statutory exceptions and preferences,216 the creation of property rights 
in their favor,217 and contractual strictures. If they have the political strength to 
carve out express exemptions in the Bankruptcy Code, courts may have little 
 
 214 See supra text and figures at notes 175–77. 
 215 See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 
(1998). 
 216 For example, see the highly problematic expansion of the many statutory safe harbors for sophisticated 
financial instruments. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
123, 124 (2010); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors for Settlement Payments and 
Securities Contracts: When is Safe Too Safe? 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 245, 253, 258 (2014); Mark J. Roe, The 
Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 572–73 (2011).  
 217 BUSSEL & SKEEL, supra note 69, at 39 (“Congress can effectively prefer some constituents over others 
by excluding property in which the preferred constituents have an interest from the estate.”).  
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flexibility to prevent the opt-out. Constitutionally protected property rights may 
similarly constrain the courts. In these cases, strict construction of statutory 
exemptions (and in some cases recharacterization of property rights based on 
substance over form analysis) may provide limited relief. 
But bankruptcy courts should not countenance creditor attempts to opt 
out of the collective process that arise only from a private contract 
between debtor and creditor. Bankruptcy has always been willing to 
sacrifice strict compliance with contractual entitlements to the 
exigencies of the collective proceeding, subject to the constraints 
imposed by federal insolvency law itself.218 The fact that these 
contractual entitlements are embodied in corporate charters does not 
alter their essentially contractual nature. Bankruptcy courts should not 
reflexively defer to pre-bankruptcy entity partitions and corporate 
charters that are the functional equivalent of a contractual right to 
withdraw assets from, or limit access to, bankruptcy relief. 
It is always open to the board of directors to invoke bankruptcy relief 
notwithstanding pre-bankruptcy contracts with creditors to the contrary. It 
should not matter whether those bargained-for bankruptcy waivers are found in 
corporate charters or creditor contracts. Once the board invokes the insolvency 
regime (or upon other creditors filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition), the 
niceties of corporate law are effectively preempted and the complex insolvency 
governance model (in which the board shares decision making power with 
competing institutions) prevails. From that point forward the bankruptcy court 
deals with the firm as a reorganization or liquidation problem in which all 
interested constituencies may have a voice, and in many cases roles, rights, and 
obligations that they did not have under the pre-bankruptcy regime.219 
Constituents with claims against affiliated companies in bankruptcy proceedings 
that effectively operate as a unified enterprise should not be surprised that they 
may be treated as a claimant against that unified enterprise, except to the extent 
that the bankruptcy equities themselves demand otherwise and so long as the 
value of their rights in property are adequately protected.220 
* * * 
  
 
 218 See JACKSON, supra note 32, at 7–19; see also Jackson, Avoiding Powers, supra note 157, at 725. 
 219 THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 230 (Yale Univ. Press 1937) (describing corporate 
insolvency proceedings as “the union of law and economics . . . celebrated by one of the wildest [intellectual] 
orgies in intellectual history”); cf. Charles J. Tabb, What’s Wrong with Chapter 11? 1–3 (U. Illinois C. Law 
Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 19-15, Mar. 14, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3352137. 
 220 See In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand, J.). 
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APPENDIX: SECURITIZATION DATA AND TRENDS NOT INVOLVING CORE 
OPERATING ASSETS OF NON-FINANCIAL ORIGINATORS 
Consumer debt obligations arising out of automobile loans and leases, home 
mortgages, student loans, cellular phone contracts, and credit cards constitute 
the largest and longest established sector of the securitization market. In 2017, 
for example, these consumer categories constituted $267 billion of the new 
issuances in the United States, or 52% of the total.221 Although beyond the scope 
of this Article, securitization of consumer debt obligations raises important 
policy issues of its own, particularly as it relates to systemically important 
financial institutions and consumer debt restructuring; consumer debt 
securitizations are not the focus of this Article. Former SEC Commissioner Luis 
A. Aguilar, for example, has publicly noted the significant public policy 
implications of the explosive growth of securitization, and suggested further 
regulation may be necessary.222 
Although also beyond the scope of this Article, the overall market for 
securitized commercial loan obligations including commercial real estate, 
accounts receivable, equipment, commercial paper, and collateralized loan 
obligations arising out of commercial transactions is even larger than the 
consumer market.  
The principal categories of commercial loan securitizations of this nature are 
commercial paper securitization, the creation of collateralized loan obligations, 
and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). CMBS sometimes mimic 
the residential real estate mortgage model in which smaller loans from many 
different borrowers are bundled together into large pools; such CMBS is outside 
the scope of this Article. In 2017, about one-third of the CMBS market, however, 
involved a large loan to a single borrower secured by a single real property 
asset.223 This sort of CMBS raises the problem of hiving off corporate assets into 
separate entities to secure corporate financings discussed here. The market for 
commercial securitization grew from nothing in the 1980s to a $6 trillion 
behemoth by 2006. Securitization issuance of all types collapsed in the Great 
Recession of 2008-09 and is only now approaching pre-recession levels.224 
 
 221 S&P Global Ratings, GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE OUTLOOK 2018: VOLUME COULD REACH $1 
TRILLION IF STEADY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PERSIST at 4 (Jan. 3, 2018) (This figure is achieved by adding all 
U.S. ABS less equipment/fleet/floorplan and adding U.S. RMBS-related). 
 222 Luis A. Aguilar, Correcting Some of the Flaws in the ABS Market (Aug. 27, 2014) (transcript available 
at SEC.gov). 
 223 S&P Global Ratings, GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE OUTLOOK 2018: VOLUME COULD REACH $1 
TRILLION IF STEADY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PERSIST at 4 (Jan. 3, 2018).  
 224 See infra chart at note 231.  
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Notwithstanding the general recovery, some submarkets, such as Asset Backed 
Commercial Paper and private label RMBS remain at small fractions of their 
prerecession levels, as demonstrated in the below Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Outstanding 2002–2018225 
In 2017, the aggregate size of these market segments in the United States 
were: Asset-based commercial paper (ABCP)—$239 billion (outstandings); 
collateralized loan obligations (CLO)—$118 billion (new issuances); and 
CMBS ex SASB—$58 billion (new issuances).226 This market principally serves 
and funds financial institutions that structure traditional commercial loan 
obligations with multiple borrowers, and then either sell off participations or 
pool the resulting assets and then securitize those pools to fund their own lending 
operations.227  
 
 225 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Asset-backed Commercial Paper 
Outstanding, FRED, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ABCOMP (last 
updated Feb. 21, 2019). 
 226 See supra Figure 1 at note 176, Figure 2 at note 177, & Figure 3 at note 225; S&P Global Ratings, 
GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE OUTLOOK 2018: VOLUME COULD REACH $1 TRILLION IF STEADY ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS PERSIST at 4 (Jan. 3, 2018).  
 227 Although the aggregate outstandings in the ABCP market remain significant in absolute terms, the 
market for ABCP collapsed in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008–09 and has never approached its 
prerecession level of $1.2 trillion. See S&P Global Ratings, GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE OUTLOOK 2018: 
VOLUME COULD REACH $1 TRILLION IF STEADY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PERSIST at 4, 18 (Jan. 3, 2018); supra 
Figure 3, at note 225.  
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Financial institutions’ decision to fund lending activities in this way may 
significantly complicate down-the-line restructuring negotiations with 
defaulting borrowers. Frequently, investors in collateralized debt obligations are 
organized as bankruptcy remote limited liability companies whose charters 
sharply limit the fund manager’s discretion in restructuring negotiations 
involving fund assets.  
In the home mortgage context, the problems caused by lack of servicer 
discretion to modify were severely aggravated in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis by the statutory limits on nonconsensual modification of home 
mortgages in the Bankruptcy Code.228 Regrettably, home mortgages on primary 
residences and most consumer automobile loans are subject to special statutory 
provisions that greatly limit the ability of consumers to nonconsensually 
restructure these obligations—regardless of whether they have been pooled and 
securitized.229 Securitization further aggravated these problems caused by 
statutory anti-modification rules by imposing contractual arrangements on 
mortgage servicers that greatly limited discretion to agree to consensual 
restructuring as well. Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski discuss the problems facing 
servicers with limited modification discretion in the context of securitization of 
residential mortgages (RMBS).230  
Although there are no comparable statutory limitations on nonconsensual 
restructuring of commercial loan obligations, securitization of those obligations 
subject to contractual restrictions on consensual restructuring may unnecessarily 
force costly “cramdown” plans. Worse, those limitations on manager authority 
may obstruct transactions that require secured creditor consent and support to 
transfer collateral free and clear or raise new capital. Nevertheless, the sale of 
participations in traditional commercial loans or their pooling and securitization 
do not create additional barriers to a borrower’s bankruptcy filing, and do not 
confer any “withdrawal right” on any creditor or exempt the underlying 
commercial loan from bankruptcy restructuring should the borrower file for 
bankruptcy relief. Accordingly, although this vast commercial loan 
securitization market, like the consumer loan securitization market, raises 
significant public policy issues, those issues are also beyond the scope of this 
Article. I nevertheless note the recent significant revival of the CDO market in 
Figure 4 below:  
 
 228 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2) (2019); see also Samuel Bufford, The Chapter 13 Alternative: A 
Legislative Solution to Undersecured Home Mortgages, 45 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 1091 (2011). 
 229 11 U.S.C §§ 1322(b)(2) (principal residences); 1325(a) (consumer automobile loans) (2019).  
 230 Mayer, Morrison & Piskorski, A New Proposal for Loan Modifications, 26 YALE J. REG. 417 (2009).  
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Figure 4: CDO New Issuances 1990–2018231 
 
 
 231 The data in Figure 4 is drawn from The ABS Database, HARRISON SCOTT PUBLICATIONS, ASSET-
BACKED ALERT, https://www.abalert.com/db/absdb.pl (last visited Aug. 6, 2019). The entire database is 
available to subscribers for download at the above link. The categories represented in Figure 4 represent 
issuances coded with the following collateral codes: AR, BZ, CB, EM, HF, HY, IG, PS, RA, RB, RL, RU, SD, 
and SP (these codes encompass both CLOs and CDOs, although I use the term CDOs here broadly to refer to 
both). Note that the data collected by Asset-Backed Alert on CDOs only includes new issuances, exclusive of 
refinancings, and repricings. SIFMA data includes refinancings and repricings and there is no ready mechanism 
for segregating them from new issuances in that data set. The SIFMA data shows a disproportionately large 
(150%) increase in CDOs in 2017. See US ABS Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA.ORG (July 1, 2019), https:// 
www.sifma.org/resources/research/us-abs-issuance-and-outstanding/, for the effect of including refinancings 
and repricings. The SIFMA and Asset-Backed Alert data sets are not strictly comparable even for new issuances. 
But SIFMA shows total CDO issuances of $119.7 billion, $294.3 billion, and $280.7 billion, for years 2016, 
2017, and 2018, respectively, while Asset-Backed Alert shows $83.6 billion, $126.3 billion, and $140.2 billion 
for the same years, suggesting that the SIFMA data includes a surge in CDO repricing and refinancing occurring 
in 2017. That elevated CDO refinancing activity appears to have continued at a slightly reduced pace in 2018. 
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